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SPILLOVER ACROSS REMEDIES
Michael Coenen*

98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming)
Abstract: Remedies influence rights, and rights apply across remedies.
Combined together, these two phenomena produce the problem of spillover
across remedies. The spillover problem occurs when considerations
specific to one remedy affect the definition of a substantive rule that
governs in other remedial settings. For example, the severe remedial
consequences of suppressing incriminating evidence might generate
substantive Fourth Amendment precedents that make other Fourth
Amendment remedies (such as damage awards, injunctions, or ex ante
denials of search warrants) more difficult to obtain. Or, the rule of lenity
might yield a narrowed reading of a statutory rule in a criminal case, which
then carries binding effect on subsequent attempts to secure civil relief
under the same statutory provision. In these and other contexts, the crossremedial scope of substantive rules can give rise to significant doctrinal
distortions, with one remedy’s influence on a substantive norm dictating the
outcome of cases that would otherwise implicate different remedial
considerations.
This Article documents several examples of cross-remedial spillover and
considers several possible responses to it. Its central conclusion is that
courts can best manage the spillover problem by varying the applicability of
substantive rules across different remedial domains. Such disaggregation
strategies already exist to some extent in the law, implemented most often
through the use of discrete, transsubstantive exceptions to remedial
requirements (consider, for instance, the qualified immunity defense to
damages liability under § 1983, or the harmless error exception to the
reversal remedy on direct appeals). Nonetheless, as this Article
demonstrates, courts can more effectively disaggregate substantive norms—
and thus more effectively mitigate spillover across remedies—by utilizing a
significantly more nuanced and substance-specific set of remedial
exceptions. In effect, such an approach would yield hybridized rules of
“right-remedy” law, with precedential effects extending no further than
*

Assistant Professor, LSU Law Center; Climenko Fellow & Lecturer on Law, Harvard
Law School, 2011-13. For helpful criticisms and suggestions, I am grateful to Anna ArkinGallagher, Joseph Blocher, Judge Guido Calabresi, Dan Coenen, James Coleman, Seth
Davis, Dick Fallon, Heather Gerken, Jeremy Golubcow-Teglasi, Erica Hashimoto, John
Jeffries, Mike Klarman, Daryl Levinson, Ashley Lott, Dina Mishra, Rachel Sachs, Chris
Sherman, and Susannah Barton Tobin.

2

Spillover Across Remedies

[14-Aug-13

particularized combinations of substantive and remedial domains. Although
that outcome might give some readers pause, it is in fact a sensible and
feasible objective for courts to pursue.
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INTRODUCTION
In adjudicating claims for relief, courts often proceed as follows:
First, they ask whether a violation of the law has occurred. If so, they next
ask whether they may furnish the requested relief. The first part of the
analysis looks to the domain of substantive law, which allocates rights and
duties among legal entities in their dealings with one another.1 The second
1

A more complete list might also include powers, liabilities, liberties, no-rights, and
other variations. See Welsey Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). Unless otherwise indicated, I will
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part of the analysis looks to the law of remedies, which tells courts when
and how to provide redress for demonstrated legal wrongs.2 To obtain its
requested relief, then, a litigant must show both that the substantive law has
been breached and that remedial law authorizes the form of relief being
sought.
As a formal matter, the law of remedies operates independently of
the substantive law. In expanding or contracting the availability of
injunctions, declaratory judgments, damage awards, evidentiary exclusion,
habeas corpus writs, and other forms of judicial remediation, courts do not
purport to alter the rights and powers that the substantive law confers.
Thus, for instance, a judicial denial of redress is not necessarily tantamount
to a judicial declaration that no wrongdoing occurred; courts can—and
often do—stay their remedial hand without signing off on the lawfulness of
the conduct for which the remedy was sought. This is a basic feature of
public law adjudication: What happens in remedial law stays in remedial
law, or so we are told.3
As a functional matter, however, remedial law interacts with rightsbased law in complex ways. Most evidently, legal remedies determine the
efficacy of legal rights. A right without a remedy is like a ship without a
sail—existent and identifiable, but of little practical use to anyone. Courtordered remedies operationalize the substantive law: they help to deter
unlawful behavior, compensate victims of legal wrongs, punish lawbreakers, and in other ways vindicate the interests that substantive rules
exist to promote. In this sense, diminished legal remedies yield weakened
substantive protections, just as augmented legal remedies make substantive
protections more robust.4
use the term “rights” as a sort of shorthand for the broader set of substantive entitlements
that individuals and government actors might hold against one another.
2
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 154 (1803) (asking, first, “[h]as the
applicant a right to the commission he demands?” And second, “if he has a right, and that
right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?”). Modern
opinions need not (and do not) always follow this order when issuing a denial of relief.
See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (permitting judges to depart from
merits-first adjudication in constitutional tort proceedings). When and to what extent
judges should engage in merits-first analysis (as opposed to other forms of “decisional
sequencing”) is a subject of rich debate, see, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional
Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2010), but that debate lies beyond the scope of this
analysis. For purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that courts almost always treat
substantive questions and remedial questions as analytically distinct.
3
See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (“The question whether the
exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as
an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”).
4
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
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A second sense in which substantive and remedial law interact
concerns not the enforcement of the substantive law, but rather the shaping
of its content. For example, before ruling on the merits of a legal dispute,
courts might anticipate the remedial consequences of a legal violation, and
having done so, become more or less inclined to declare that a legal
violation occurred. Some scholars have suggested, for instance, that the
exclusionary remedy deters the development of strong substantive Fourth
Amendment protections, as trial judges, loath to suppress damning
evidence, find clever ways to declare that no constitutional violation ever
occurred.5 Along similar lines, scholars have suggested that nonretroactivity rules facilitate the expansion of individual liberties, by
reducing the deterrent effect that the otherwise high cost of retroactive
remediation would exert on judges contemplating changes in the substantive
law.6 Remedial dynamics may affect rights-based law in subtler ways as
well. They may, for instance, introduce selection biases into the pool of

COLUM. L. REV. 857, 887 (1999).
5
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799
(1994); Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112
(2003); Section II.E infra; see also Steven M. Shepard, Note, The Case Against Automatic
Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L.J. 1180 (2008) (suggesting that the high cost of
automatic reversal remedy deters appellate courts from identifying constitutional criminal
procedure violations when reviewing trial court proceedings); Sonja B. Starr, Sentence
Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1515–16 (2009)
(identifying a similar phenomenon in connection with prosecutorial misconduct claims);
Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in International
Courts, 83 NYU L. REV. 693 (2008) (exploring connection between high-cost remedies
applied by International Criminal Tribunals and the shaping of international human rights
law). See generally Levinson, supra note ?, at 889–99 (describing this phenomenon as
“remedial deterrence”).
6
John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REV. 47, 80 (1998) (“Nonretroactivity facilitated the creation of new rights by reducing
the costs of innovation.”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap In Constitutional
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999) (suggesting that immunity rules in constitutional tort law
“advance[s] the growth and development of constitutional law”); see also Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in
Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601 (2004) (criticizing courts’ use of “remand
without vacatur” remedies in administrative law on the ground that the low-cost features of
the remedy “facilitate[] the use of more aggressive judicial scrutiny of agencies’ reasoning
process”). Professor Richard Fallon has embraced this basic insight in terms of what he
calls the “Equilibration Thesis,” which holds that “justiciability, substantive, and remedial
doctrines are substantially interconnected and that courts frequently face a choice about
which doctrine to adjust in order to achieve acceptable results overall.” Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies – And Their Connections To
Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 692 (2006); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking
the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 480 (2011).
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litigants who advance particular substantive claims.7 Or, perhaps, they may
trigger cognitive biases within the judges evaluating these claims.8
Remedial fingerprints, simply put, lie all over the substantive law.
Sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly, rules governing the redress of legal
wrongs influence courts’ definitions of the legal wrongs themselves.
This form of right-remedy interdependence has recently attracted the
attention of public law scholars. Their work has yielded valuable new
insights on the age-old right-remedy distinction and has helped to
underscore the importance of thinking carefully about the remedial
environments from which substantive law emerges. Though varied in its
evaluative approaches and prescriptive contributions,9 all of the scholarship
7

See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences
of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990) (noting the possible
existence of “a pro-defendant bias in the application and evolution of legal standards”
resulting from the government’s inability to obtain reversals of acquittals in criminal
cases); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011) (documenting
systematic bias in favor of patentability “arising from the asymmetric nature of appeals
from the PTO to the Federal Circuit”); see also John M. Graebe, Objecting at the Altar:
Why the Good Faith Principle and the Harlow Qualified Immunity Doctrine Should Not Be
Married, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 15 (2012) (noting potential substantive effects
arising from the involvement of private insurance attorneys—rather than government
attorneys—in representing defendants in constitutional tort suits).
8
Commentators have suggested, for example, that the exclusionary remedy triggers
the application of “hindsight bias” in Fourth Amendment cases, whereby judges’ ex post
knowledge of a search’s results distorts their view of whether probable cause existed to
conduct the search ex ante. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck
the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 403; William J. Stuntz, Warrants and
Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 912 (1991); see also Pamela S. Karlan,
Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2019–20
(1998) (suggesting that hindsight bias might also prejudice appellate courts’ after-the-fact
review of Batson claims asserted by defendants who were convicted in the court below).
9
Within individual fields, commentators have drawn attention to linkages between
remedial context and substantive law, and some commentators have proposed targeted
responses to such linkages they deem to be problematic. See notes 4–7 supra. More
systematic examinations of the phenomenon offer functional taxonomies of right-remedy
relationships, emblematized by Professor Daryl Levinson’s work on the “equilibration”
phenomenon that inheres in the transposition of remedial and substantive rules. See, e.g.,
Levinson, supra note ?, at 889–913; see also Fallon [VA. L. REV.], supra note ?, at 681–88
(building on Levinson’s work to develop a general thesis regarding the interconnectivity of
justiciability rules, substantive law, and remedial law). In a related vein, Professor Nancy
Leong has investigated the frequency with which different types of Fourth Amendment
claims arise in different remedial contexts, while also advancing the thesis that courts
produce higher quality law when they adjudicate substantive rights across multiple
remedial environments. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405 (2012); see
also Section II.C infra. Finally, Professor Jennifer Laurin has investigated the processes by
which different remedial contexts shape the definition and implementation of criminal
procedure rights, focusing in particular on ameliorating “language barriers” that materialize

6

Spillover Across Remedies

[14-Aug-13

in this area adheres the basic premise that remedy-related variables affect
not just the intensity with which substantive rights get enforced, but also the
content of the substantive rights themselves.
Left largely unaddressed by this work, however, is a basic question:
Is it bad for remedies to influence the shaping of substantive law and, if so,
why? Consider, for instance, the argument that the exclusionary rule
problematically “distorts” Fourth Amendment protections, by making
judges hesitant to declare that searches violate the Constitution. Taken
alone, this claim offers no meaningful criticism of the status quo. For one
thing, it begs the question of what an “undistorted” set of Fourth
Amendment protections would look like. Unless we are prepared to call for
the shaping of rights-based doctrine in a vacuum—uninfluenced by
remedial considerations in every potential way—then we must concede that
there is no such thing as a “pure” legal right for remedies to come in and
corrupt. The harm of “distortion,” in other words, cannot lie in the mere
fact that remedies influence rights; that is, after all, the fact whose harm we
are attempting to discover.
Perhaps, though, the “distortion” argument might go as follows:
The problem with the exclusionary rule is not merely that it shapes Fourth
Amendment doctrine, but that, relative to other potential remedies, it
produces fewer judicial findings that Fourth Amendment violations have
occurred. If we were to replace the exclusionary rule with a more lenient
remedy—say, a small reduction in the defendant’s sentence,10 or limited
damages liability against the offending public entity11—then courts would
more often invalidate searches under the Fourth Amendment and thereby
create a more expansive set of Fourth Amendment requirements. But even
if that premise is true, civil libertarians should not necessarily abandon the
exclusionary rule. For, as we already noticed above, weakened remedies
reduce the real-world effectiveness of the rights to which they attach. (All
else equal, for instance, the availability of the exclusionary remedy is more
likely to deter unlawful behavior than the prospect of a nominal damages
award.) To evaluate the exclusionary rule’s desirability from this
perspective, the civil libertarian would have to ask whether courts will
better safeguard Fourth Amendment freedoms by remediating violations
more harshly but less frequently (i.e., with the exclusionary rule), or more
frequently but less harshly (i.e., with a modest monetary sanction or another
remedy of roughly equivalent lenience). That is an important question, to
when courts attempt to enforce constitutional criminal procedure protections in civil cases.
Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1002, 1007 (2010).
10
See Calabresi, supra note ?, at 116–18.
11
See Slobogin, supra note ?, at 405–18.
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be sure, but it relates not so much to the “distortion” of Fourth Amendment
law as it does to the question of how courts should mete out limited
remedial capital across a range of cases.12
There is, however, a third and more promising respect way to frame
the “distortion” argument. The key move is to recognize that Fourth
Amendment law gets applied in remedial environments other than criminal
suppression hearings. Magistrate judges apply the Fourth Amendment
when deciding whether to issue a warrant. Section 1983 cases present
Fourth Amendment questions linked to requests for injunctions, damages,
or declaratory relief. Fourth Amendment claims might even arise in
criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 241. These environments concern
remedies very different from the suppression of evidence in criminal cases.
And yet, judges who operate within these environments sometimes apply
precedents that derive from suppression motions in criminal cases. Thus,
when remedial dynamics unique to the question of suppression deter the
finding of a Fourth Amendment violation, the effects of the holding threaten
to spill over into other remedial settings in which the same right gets
adjudicated. The distortionary harm, in other words, stems not just from the
fact that remedies influence substantive law, but from the further fact that
substantive law applies across multiple remedial contexts. Formally
speaking, we do not have different Fourth Amendment doctrines for § 1983
actions, suppression hearings, probable cause hearings, and so on. Instead,
there simply is one Fourth Amendment doctrine, and it applies equally
across these different remedial contexts. Thus, when a particular remedial
environment influences the shaping of Fourth Amendment law, the
alteration applies beyond its own remedial boundaries.
This particular problem—what I call the problem of spillover across
remedies—is the focus of this Article. Several areas of substantive
doctrine, I argue, have developed (or are at risk of developing) features that,
while responsive to the demands of a single remedial environment, affect
the law’s application within other such environments as well. Once
embedded in the substantive law, a “remedy-specific” influence becomes
part of a “cross-remedial” doctrine, destined to manifest itself within other
remedial environments where it would not otherwise have taken hold. The
spillover problem, in other words, arises as a consequence of two bedrock
features of public law adjudication: (1) the inescapable intertwinedness of
substantive and remedial law; and (2) the generalized application of
substantive law across multiple remedial settings. When one remedy affects
the scope of a substantive rule, the cross-remedial nature of that rule
12

To be clear, the point is not that such reform proposals are misguided; rather, it is
that the reform proposals target something other than “distortions” within the substantive
law.
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threatens to distort its development within other remedial settings.13
With the spillover problem thus acknowledged, the question
becomes how to deal with it. The central thesis of this Article is that courts
can best manage spillover through strategies of disaggregation, which vary
the applicability of substantive rules across the different remedies used to
enforce them.14 Disaggregation strategies attack spillover from the backend. Rather than attempt to mitigate or eliminate the ways in which
remedies affect rights, these strategies focus on confining remedy-specific
13

Individual examples of the spillover problem have not gone entirely unnoticed
within the literature. See, e.g., Laurin, supra note ?, at 1034; Starr, Rethinking “Effective
Remedies”, supra note ?, at 720–24; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional
Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 275–79 (2000); Lawrence Solan, Statutory Inflation and
Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209 (2003). As best I can tell, however, no
one has yet offered a systematic and transsubstantive analysis of the sort this Article seeks
to provide.
14
I draw this term from the scholarship of Professor John Jeffries, who has advocated
for “disaggregating” remedial rules of constitutional tort law across different categories of
substantive claims. See Jeffries [Yale L.J.], supra note ?, at 280 (“It is my contention that
the liability rule for money damages should vary with the constitutional violation at
issue.”). This Article advocates a sort of converse strategy, which disaggregates substantive
rules of law across different categories of remedies. I view these two projects as
complementary rather than in tension with one another; both are part and parcel of a
broader effort to “reject the radical dissociation of right and remedy immanent in current
doctrine,” id. at 281. Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate further in Part III, the disaggregation
of rights across remedies is facilitated, rather than hindered, by the simultaneous
disaggregation of remedies across rights. The two strategies proceed along different paths,
to be sure, but both paths are ultimately headed towards the same summit.
Of related significance to this project is Professor Jennifer Laurin’s rich
discussion of “rights translation” within the law of constitutional criminal procedure. In
advocating for a process that permits certain “components” of a substantive rule to “shift in
a new remedial context,” Laurin, supra note ?, at 1007, Professor Laurin’s work may be
read as endorsing limited forms of disaggregation across civil-criminal boundaries. Her
scholarship, however, does not focus specifically on the spillover problem, and it confines
itself exclusively to the application of criminal procedure protections in civil and criminal
cases. I thus regard this project as complementary to Professor Laurin’s work, as it seeks
to bolster the case for the disaggregated law that a “rights translation” process might
sometimes yield, while covering more expansive substantive and remedial terrains.
Finally, Professor Larry Sager’s “underenforcement thesis” bears mention in
connection with this project, insofar as it advocates for a disaggregated definition of
judicially enforceable constitutional law on the one hand and constitutional law (full stop)
on the other. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Without such disaggregation, as
Professor Sager points out, institutional limitations specific to the judiciary might yield
unnecessary curtailments in the scope of substantive constitutional requirements that other
institutional actors (such as legislators and executive officials) look to for guidance. Id. at
1213. This Article builds on Professor Sager’s thesis by suggesting that further
disaggregation can and should occur within the category of judicially enforceable
constitutional law, so as to prevent spillover from one remedial setting into another.
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influences on rights to the particular remedial settings in which they arise.
If, for instance, we allow equal protection rules to differ based on whether a
litigant seeks civil or criminal relief, considerations particular to the civil
setting are less likely to influence courts’ resolution of criminal equal
protection claims (and vice versa). If Fourth Amendment rules differ
according to whether a judge is considering a suppression motion ex post or
a warrant application ex ante, influences specific to the former remedial
context are less likely to interfere with the Fourth Amendment’s application
in the latter. And so on. Simply put, the weaker the pressures for crossremedial uniformity, the weaker the threat of cross-remedial spillover.
As it turns out, many areas of the law already pursue disaggregation
strategies of this sort. They rely in particular on remedial exceptions, which
limit the applicability of some (but not other) forms of relief associated with
identical substantive claims. These exceptions help to reduce—albeit in
indirect (and sometimes blunt) fashion—cross-remedial spillover within the
law of rights. Rules of qualified and absolute immunity, for instance,
render constitutional rights more difficult to vindicate when raised as
“offensive” swords against public actors (for example, via actions for
injunctive or monetary relief) rather than “defensive” shields in criminal
prosecutions.15 Exceptions to the exclusionary rule remove some Fourth
Amendment protections from the reach of criminal defendants at trial, even
as those same protections might necessitate the denial of a warrant
application, or the granting of monetary or injunctive relief in a civil
proceeding.16 The harmless error rule creates a similar disparity between
the (broader) set of procedural protections that are capable of yielding relief
during trials and the (narrower) set of such protections that are capable of
yielding reversals on appeal.17 As a formal matter, the same substantive
claims—supported by the same substantive precedents—are asserted and
disposed of in these different remedial contexts, and to the extent that
variations in outcomes arise, the variations remain attributable to formally
15

See MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION xxii–xxiii (2002) (distinguishing
between “[d]efensive, “shield-like” remedies,” and “offensive remedies”); Walter E.
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532,
1532 (1972) (contrasting between defensive constitutional remedies, which employ the
“sanction of nullification” of government imposed punishments, and offensive
constitutional remedies, which seek “to use the judicial power to force affirmative action”).
16
But see Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing
and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 673 (2011) (identifying similarities between
the Court’s exceptions to the exclusionary rule and its exceptions to § 1983 damages
liability).
17
Cf. Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 26
(2002) (“Unless an appellate court determines that an error is prejudicial, the Court has no
authority to remedy that error, by whatever means”).
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remedial rather than formally substantive rules. From a functional
perspective, however, remedial exceptions can (and often do) produce
disaggregated substantive doctrine, as they render identical substantive rules
more or less susceptible to vindication depending solely on the remedial
context in which these rules are litigated. A primary purpose of this Article,
then, is to highlight this underappreciated virtue of remedial exceptions: By
disaggregating the application of substantive norms across remedial
boundaries, remedial exceptions substantially mitigate the problem of
spillover across remedies.
That is not to say, however, that remedial exceptions currently on
the books have enjoyed unconditional success as anti-spillover devices, and
this Article thus goes on to propose ways in which courts might more
effectively define and deploy these exceptions to perform this role.
Generally speaking, the improvements I suggest involve making remedial
exceptions more particularized and substance-specific. Rather than employ
a small number of broad remedial exceptions—applicable across a wide
range of substantive norms—courts should employ a larger number of
narrower exceptions, targeting particularized combinations of substantive
and remedial rules. Pushed far enough in this direction, remedial
exceptions might even start to lose their “remedial” character altogether,
looking less and less like discrete carve-outs to otherwise uniform rules of
remedial law, and more and more like hybridized rules of “right-remedy”
law, whose content depends on both the type of relief a litigant demands
and the type of substantive claim she asserts. That transformation would
further increase both the appearance and reality of cross-remedial variations
in the substantive law, making, in effect, the disaggregating function of
remedial exceptions even more explicit and complete.
These observations tee up the final question with which this Article
grapples: Is disaggregation proper? For even if courts can best manage the
spillover problem by varying substantive rights across remedial boundaries,
overriding considerations may nonetheless counsel against this approach.
In particular, I confront four separate concerns that the disaggregation
strategy presents: (1) that it improperly ascribes multiple definitions to
substantive rules derived from a single textual source; (2) that it creates
overwhelming problems of administrability; (3) that it jeopardizes
important rule-of-law values; and (4) that, with respect to a limited category
of rights and remedies, it impedes higher-level courts’ ability to supervise
the work of their lower-level counterparts. While I acknowledge the
validity of each of these concerns, I conclude that none provides sufficient
grounds for abandoning the disaggregation strategy altogether.
Here, then, is the remaining plan of attack: Part I introduces the
spillover problem by offering examples from public law adjudication. Part
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II appraises a preliminary set of “non-disaggregation” anti-spillover
strategies, each of which aims to mitigate the spillover problem while
maintaining uniform enforcement of substantive rules across remedial
boundaries. For example, courts could attempt to alleviate spillover by
forging rules of substantive law with all applicable remedial contexts in
mind. Or they could reform remedial structures with an eye toward
“equalizing” the influences that different remedial structures exert on the
shaping of substantive rules. Or they could seek to expand the number of
remedial settings in which a given substantive rule gets applied, with the
hope that a “diversified” set of remedial inputs will ensure that no single
remedy predominates in affecting the content of a substantive rule. These
anti-spillover strategies, I suggest, can preserve the formal uniformity of
substantive rules across different remedial domains, but they ultimately
provide inadequate solutions. We should therefore consider the alternative
strategy of disaggregating the substantive law according to different
remedial demands.
Part III turns to the use of remedial exceptions to achieve
disaggregation in the law. I first demonstrate how our current palette of
remedial exceptions already functionally disaggregates the substantive law
in a way that mitigates cross-remedial spillover effects, and I then suggest
ways in which courts might further improve these exceptions’ performance
as anti-spillover devices. Finally, Part IV offers a qualified defense of
disaggregation within the substantive law, concluding that no overriding
considerations should compel us to reject it categorically.
One final caveat: Lest I be misunderstood, this Article is not
intended to push for the total disaggregation of rights across remedies. I am
not enthusiastic about reviving the common law writ system, along with its
myriad forms of action governed by discrete, self-contained packages of
procedural, substantive, and remedial rules.18 Nor do I advocate for the
total dissolution of the formal boundaries that separate “substantive” from
“remedial” law. Whatever the conceptual merits of the right-remedy
distinction, it is a distinction around which the public law has organized
itself for quite some time, and it will remain a key organizing principle of
the doctrine for years to come. I do not, then, propose a total restructuring
of doctrinal rules governing judicial action in public law disputes. Instead, I
push for more modest improvements to categorization schemes already in
effect. We can, I think, achieve more disaggregation of the law (and
concomitantly less spillover across remedies) without going so far as to
dissolve the categories of “right” and “remedy” altogether. How far down
this road we should travel is a difficult question that I won’t purport to
18

1990).

See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 63–83 (3d ed.
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resolve here. But I do hope to show that there’s plenty of room to move in
that direction before needing to worry that we’ve gone too far.
I.

CROSS-REMEDIAL SPILLOVER IN ACTION

To help reveal how cross-remedial spillover happens, this Part sets
forth some examples of the phenomenon in action. The examples span both
constitutional and nonconstitutional cases,19 and reveal two important
points: (1) remedies can affect the definition of substantive rules in a variety
of ways; and (2) substantive holdings shaped in one remedial context can
acquire precedential force within other remedial contexts as well. When
these two things happen to the same substantive rule, spillover across
remedies will occur.
In one sense, much of what follows should be familiar to students of
the right-remedy relationship. Public law scholars have long been familiar
with the ways in which remedy-specific variables can affect courts’
disposition of substantive claims, and many of the examples I discuss below
build on descriptive observations these scholars already have offered. What
has received less attention, however, are the cross-remedial aftershocks that
follow from a particular remedy’s point of contact with a substantive rule.
It is on these aftershocks that this Part seeks to shed new descriptive light.
A. Procedural Due Process Law and Monetary Relief Under § 1983
In Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that government-inflicted
harm to “reputation alone” did not trigger procedural due process
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.20 This holding diverged
sharply from the Court’s earlier suggestion, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
that due process restrictions applied whenever “a person’s good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him.”21 Though not purporting to overrule Constantineau, the
Court in Paul made clear that stigmatic injuries alone could not give rise to
procedural due process claims; instead, stigmatic injuries could trigger such
claims only when accompanied by some other “more tangible” harm, such
as the loss of employment or a specific business opportunity.22
19

This Article’s focus on rights and remedies within the public (but not private) law
context reflects only an expositional choice. I do not intend to communicate any deep
point concerning the prevalence (or lack thereof) of analogous forms of spillover across
private law remedies.
20
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695 (1976).
21
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
22
Paul, 424 U.S. at 695.
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Remedy-specific considerations favored the Court’s adoption of this
“stigma plus” rule. In contrast to Constantineau, where the plaintiff sought
to invalidate a Wisconsin state statute via an injunction,23 Paul involved a
demand for monetary relief against individual police officers. The officers
had circulated a flyer to hundreds of local merchants, with the names and
photographs of supposedly “active shoplifters,” including the plaintiff,
Davis. Having never in fact been convicted of shoplifting, Davis sued
under § 1983, alleging that circulation of the flyer violated his due process
rights and demanding compensation for the reputational harm he had
suffered.
Paul thus resembled a garden-variety defamation suit,
pigeonholed into a § 1983 action because of the public, rather than private,
status of the alleged defamatory actors. To the majority, this point mattered
a great deal. If successful, the Court reasoned, the plaintiff’s suit would
convert the Fourteenth Amendment into a “font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the
States.”24 And from the Court’s reluctance “to derive from congressional
civil rights statutes a body of general federal tort law,” it followed “[a]
fortiori” that “the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause cannot
be the source of such law.”25
The Paul majority marshaled other arguments in support of its
“stigma plus” approach. But many commentators have suggested that the
“font of tort law” concern drove the Court’s ruling.26 Simply put, the
Supreme Court did not want § 1983 to authorize defamation actions against
public officials. But rather than render a decision about the reach of
permissible damage remedies under § 1983, it chose to discuss the Due
Process Clause instead. The upshot was the creation of rights-based law,
applicable beyond the immediate remedial setting that Paul itself presented.
Thus, as Professor Jeffries has pointed out, insofar as the Court in Paul
chose to “limit[] liability by constricting rights,” its rights-based resolution
of the case swept broadly across all other remedial contexts, “mean[ing]

23

See Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
25
Id.
26
See, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v.
Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 569, 576–77 & n.29 (1999) (“Many scholars have understood the
Court’s holding to result in large part from the Court’s view that it could not permit the
defamation claim in Paul without opening the door of the federal courts to a whole range of
other tort-like claims involving deprivations of life, liberty, or property.”); Jeffries [Yale
L.J.], supra note ?, at 277 (hypothesizing that “Paul v. Davis is an example of the § 1983
tail wagging the constitutional dog”); Levinson, supra note ?, at 893 (“In all likelihood,
Paul would have come out differently if the only available remedy had been an
injunction.”).
24
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that injunctions, defenses, and other remedies [were] also precluded.”27
And, indeed, since its adoption, the stigma-plus rule has applied in
remedial settings quite different from what the Court confronted in Paul.
Courts have grappled with the rule, for instance, when considering: (1) a
corporation’s request for a declaratory judgment regarding the
constitutionality of CERCLA-based regulatory procedures implemented by
the EPA;28 (2) an attorney’s motion for a “name-clearing hearing” before a
court that sharply criticized his conduct in a published opinion;29 (3) several
cases in which litigants sought declaratory and/or injunctive relief
concerning the constitutionality of state-law sex offender registration
requirements;30 and (4) a request for an affirmative injunction mandating
27

Jeffries [Yale L.J.], supra note ?, at 289; see also Christina Brooks Whitman,
Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 674
(1997) (“If the Constitution is held to be inapplicable where official misconduct looks too
much like the subject of tort, other remedies will be foreclosed as well.”). For another
example of damages-induced spillover, consider Professor Jeffries’s discussion of County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). There, the Court confronted a § 1983 action
arising from a fatal motorcycle accident that occurred in the course of a high-speed police
chase (and allegedly caused by a deputy sheriff’s reckless driving). The Court denied §
1983 damages to the victim’s parents (who alleged a substantive due process violation), on
the ground that the deputy sheriff did not actually intend to harm their son. (Reckless
indifference or gross negligence, in other words, was simply not enough.)
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854. Professor Jeffries speculates that Lewis, like Paul v. Davis, was
“another example of the prospect of monetary damages inducing a restrictive definition of
the underlying right,” and that, while it is impossible to know for sure, the Court might
potentially have reacted differently to the Lewises’ claim had it arisen in “another remedial
context.” Jeffries, supra note ?, at 278–79. If so, we need not look far for examples of the
Lewis rule yielding spillover across remedies.
Consider, for instance, the Second Circuit’s holding in Graziano v. Pataki, 689
F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). There, the court denied injunctive and declaratory
relief to a group of prisoners who alleged that they had repeatedly been denied parole for
“arbitrary or impermissible reasons,” in violation of their substantive due process rights. Id.
at 115. The court made short shrift of these claims, relying on the Supreme Court’s earlier
proclamation in Lewis that “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be
arbitrary in the constitutional sense,” id. at 116 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). Again,
the key point here is not that Graziano was wrongly decided, but rather that Graziano arose
in a remedial setting very different from the one the Court confronted in Lewis.
Nevertheless, Lewis, whose holding derived largely from concerns about awarding
damages relief, controlled the outcome of Graziano, a case where the prospect of damages
relief was not on the table.
28
General Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 111, 121–23 (D.C. Cir. 2010) [That this was
a declaratory judgment action is demonstrated by the lower court filings, see 2001 WL
36080053]; see also Asbetic Construction Services v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 767–69 (2d Cir.
1988) (similar).
29
United States v. Sigma Intern, Inc., 300 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(per curiam).
30
The cases here have gone both ways. Compare, e.g., Schepers v. Commissioner,
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adoption of specialized procedural safeguards by a public commission
tasked with investigating and accusing individuals of public bribery.31
Meritorious or not, these claims gave rise to remedial requests that in no
way threatened to open the floodgates to tort-like litigation under the Due
Process Clause.32 Nonetheless, they all were decided by reference to a rule
that emerged from worries about converting the Fourteenth Amendment
into a “font of tort law.”
B. Equal Protection Law and the Civil/Criminal Divide
A subtler example of the spillover problem involves the
“discriminatory purpose” rule of Washington v. Davis.33 The plaintiffs in
Davis sought an injunction against the D.C. Police Department, alleging
that a screening examination for prospective employers violated
constitutional equal protection requirements. Because the Davis plaintiffs
lacked direct evidence of discriminatory intent, they founded their claim on
a showing of discriminatory impact—that is, on statistical evidence that
white applicants far more often passed the exam than their black
Indiana Dept. of Correction, 691 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that Indiana state sex
offender registry did implicate valid liberty interests under Paul, because placement on the
registry “deprives [individuals] of a variety of rights and privileges held by ordinary
Indiana citizens”); Coleman v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 655, 673 (5th Cir. 2005) (Jones, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that a Fifth Circuit panel misapplied
the law in a sex offender registry case, by “transforming the Paul v. Davis ‘stigma-plus’
test into ‘plus=stigma’”), with Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 644–45 (8th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting a procedural due process challenge to a Minnesota sex offender statute on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to satisfy Paul’s “stigma-plus” requirement); Doe v. Moore,
410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Paul v. Davis for the proposition that a sex
offender statute did not offend any “fundamental right,” cognizable on substantive due
process grounds); Brown v. City of Michigan City, Indiana, 462 F.3d 720, 729 (2006)
(upholding municipal sex offender ordinance on the ground that city’s classification of the
plaintiff as a “present threat” to children, while certainly damaging to his reputation, did
not “fulfill the ‘plus’ factor of the Paul v. Davis test”). Some of the inter-circuit
disagreement on this question was put to rest by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), where rather than
reach the question of whether a Connecticut sex offender statute was valid under Paul, the
Court determined that the statute’s application turned solely on the existence of a past
conviction, and that the existence of a conviction was “a fact that a[n] offender has already
had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest.” Id. at 8. Yet even the post-Doe
cases continue to grapple with Paul and its stigma-plus rule, see, e.g., Schepers, 691 F.3d at
1216, even though many of these cases present nothing akin to a common-law tort action.
31
Aponte v. Calderon, 284 F.3d 184, 195–98 (2002).
32
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
33
426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 266
(1977).
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counterparts.34 That showing was good enough for the D.C. Circuit, which
found for the plaintiffs.35 But the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
discriminatory effects could not establish a constitutional violation, unless
accompanied by a showing of discriminatory purpose.
Animating the Court’s holding was a concern about the remedial
consequences of a disparate impact rule. Such a rule, as Justice White
explained for the majority, “would be far reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more
burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent
white.”36 A more exacting standard was thus necessary to prevent judicial
meddling in these and other government operations.37 Indeed, as Professor
Levinson has explained, invalidating the test in Davis would have “invited,
if not compelled” the Court “to address the underlying problem of
educational disadvantage, which might point toward massive structural
reform of education.”38 And that, in turn, would have ultimately led the
Court down a path without “any nonarbitrary stopping point for remedies
short of the wholesale restructuring of the basic institutions of society to
redistribute resources and power more fairly among racial groups.”39 This
was, as Levinson has put it, “not a project courts would be inclined (or
allowed) to undertake.”40 And thus Davis’s discriminatory purpose
requirement stemmed largely from “a concern with institutional limitations,
going to remedies.”41
Subsequent cases have confirmed that Davis’s rejection of disparate
impact liability under the Equal Protection Clause applies within other
remedial contexts.42 Notably, the discriminatory purpose rule applies with
equal force in criminal cases, in which defendants seek not sweeping
injunctions against government agencies, but defensive relief from the
specific focus of government-imposed punishment. Until recently, for
34

Id. at 235, 237.
Washington v. Davis, 512 F.2d 956, 961–65 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
36
Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
37
Id. at 239, 240.
38
Levinson, supra note ?, at 899.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.; Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1414 (1988) (noting that the Davis Court “stated
as an important justification [for its discriminatory purpose requirement] the need to limit
the intrusiveness of federal judicial remedies”).
42
Cf. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 952–53 (1989) (“The more important aspect of Washington v. Davis . . . was the
Court’s ruling that the discriminatory intent standard is a comprehensive account of what
constitutes impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
35
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instance, federal drug crimes involving one gram of crack cocaine were
punished just as harshly as drug crimes involving 100 grams of powder
cocaine.43 The 100:1 ratio, though race-neutral on its face, exerted an
obvious discriminatory impact on African-Americans, who face far greater
risks of prosecution on crack-cocaine charges.44 Notwithstanding powerful
statistical confirmations of this fact, Washington v. Davis stood as an
impenetrable barrier to equal protection relief, as black crack-cocaine
defendants never managed to gather enough evidence to satisfy Davis’s
discriminatory purpose requirement.45
Perhaps the crack-cocaine sentencing regime does in fact reflect a
discriminatory intent under Davis, or at least has such a massively disparate
racial impact to raise a burden-shifting inference of such intent. The
important question for our purposes, however, is whether courts in the
criminal setting should even be applying the Davis rule at all. Two
important differences between criminal and non-criminal cases suggest that
they should not. First, criminal cases implicate heightened liberty interests.
“Locking someone up in cage for a period of years,” as Professor David
Sklansky has put it, “is singularly serious business,” and that fact alone
might justify a less “universalist” scheme of equal protection review across
civil and criminal lines.46 Justice White himself had pointed out in a preDavis decision that in criminal cases, “where the power of the State weighs
most heavily upon the individual or the group, [courts] must be especially
sensitive to the policies of the Equal Protection Clause.”47 Consequently,
while the practical difficulties of remediation might be enough to justify
tolerating discriminatory impact in connection with education, employment,
and the disbursement of other government-provided benefits, the same
might not be true when the government throws its citizens behind bars.48
43

The ratio now stands at 18:1. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111220, 124 Stat. 2372 (to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)).
44
See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1283, 1289 (1995).
45
See Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1303 & n.93 (citing cases for the proposition that “the
[crack cocaine] defendants always have lost, and the opinions generally have been both
unanimous and short”). But cf. United States v. Blewett, No. 12-5226/5882, slip op. at 7–
11 (May 17, 2013) (relying on equal protection principles to hold that the Fair Sentencing
Act applies retroactively to all defendants sentenced under the previous 100:1 ratio).
46
Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1305.
47
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
48
The Court would later flip this idea on its head, implying in McCleskey v. Kemp that,
if anything, criminal cases necessitated a less rigorous set of equal protection requirements
than Davis and its progeny had set forth. 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987). Emphasizing that
“[o]ne of society’s most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its citizens and one of
the most basic ways in which it achieves the task is through the criminal laws against
murder,” id., the Court in McCleskey rejected a statistical proffer of discrimination in
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Second, the practical difficulties of equal protection remediation
may actually be easier to overcome in the criminal context. In civil cases,
equalizing treatment of whites and nonwhites often amounts to a zero-sum
game, in the sense that court-ordered gains for nonwhites translate directly
into court-ordered losses for white beneficiaries of the status quo. Hiring
more black police officers means hiring fewer white officers; reducing de
facto school segregation means reducing white enrollment in neighborhood
schools; increasing welfare benefits for black recipients means decreasing
benefits for white recipients; and so on. But with criminal sentencing
schemes, courts can achieve improvements for nonwhite defendants without
worsening the situation of their white counterparts, by reducing the
sentences that are disproportionately experienced by one racial group while
leaving unchanged the sentences that other defendants receive.49 This is not
capital sentencing as insufficient to demonstrate purposeful discrimination, id. (“Because
discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear
proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.”). I share Professor
Sklansky’s reaction to this reasoning: it reflects an “even starker illustration than the crack
cases of the appalling blindness of our current approach to equal protection.” Sklansky,
supra note ?, at 1317. Powerful as the state’s interest in preventing murder might be, that
interest does not require courts apply relaxed equal protection standards when reviewing
capital sentences, which, even if invalidated, would leave states free to enforce criminal
prohibitions with very serious alternative sentences. And when viewed against the fact that
the sentencing determination implicates nothing less than the defendant’s interest in
remaining alive, the McCleskey Court’s call for more equal protection deference to a state’s
imposition of the death penalty (as compared to, say, a state’s hiring practices or allocation
of public benefits) seems to me bizarre and wrongheaded. See also McCleskey, 379 U.S. at
347–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for giving a perverse “new
meaning” to the notion that “death is different,” by “rely[ing] on the very fact that this is a
case involving capital punishment to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause”).
That being said, I also agree with Professor Sklansky that McCleskey’s
questionable logic, even if accepted, would not extend to courts’ review of crack/cocaine
sentencing disparities under federal law. For one thing, McCleskey’s holding derived in
part from the Court’s desire not to intrude on sovereign states’ administration of their own
criminal justice systems. Such concerns are wholly absent when a federal court reviews
the constitutionality of a federal sentencing scheme. Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1317.
Second, McCleskey’s result depended on the highly discretionary nature of the sentencing
scheme that Georgia then employed, which made it especially difficult for courts to probe
“the motives and influences” underlying any given capital verdict. McCleskey, 491 U.S. at
297; Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1317 n.174. The crack/cocaine laws, by contrast, “are part
of a sentencing system that has intentionally replaced broadly diffused discretion with a
uniform and comprehensive set of rules,” thus making it practically more feasible to
determine whether the scheme as defined infringes on a defendant’s equal protection rights.
Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1317.
49
For a similar observation, applicable to claims of discriminatory prosecution, see
Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent Nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective
Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 138
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to say that promoting racial equality in the remedial context of criminal
sentencing determinations is a straightforward exercise. At the very least,
however, courts can engage in the enterprise without having to inflict direct
costs on members of another racial group.50
What is notable about Washington v. Davis’s migration into the
criminal sentencing context is not simply that the migration occurred; it is
that no court even seemed to notice, much less question, its occurrence.51
When the Court in Davis issued a holding concerning the equal protection
guarantee—rather than, say, a holding about the availability of injunctive
remedies for equal protection violations—it unleashed the forces of crossremedial spillover. No court thereafter deemed itself free to consider the
possibility of varying disparate impact requirements across civil-criminal
lines, even though different remedial dynamics might well have warranted a
different substantive approach. Consequently, the same substantive equal
protection law now applies in two very different remedial contexts, even
though fundamental differences between these two contexts might well
warrant disparate forms of disparate impact review.
C. Hybrid Statutes
The examples offered to this point come from the domain of
constitutional law. But spillover across remedies can occur in other fields
as well. Congress sometimes enacts “hybrid statutes,” which create
nonconstitutional norms subject to both civil and criminal enforcement.
These hybrid statutes create difficulties when the civil or criminal nature of
(2003).
50
In addition, as Professor Sklansky has pointed out, while the Court “has frequently
expressed reluctance to insert itself into matters outside its traditional domain and issues
beyond the special competence of the judiciary,” “criminal sentencing is well inside that
domain and close to the core of that competence.” Id. at 1316.
51
None of this is to say that the Davis standard applies without differentiation across
the entire spectrum of equal protection cases. In fact, as Professor Daniel Ortiz has
observed, discriminatory intent requirements do in fact vary across several different areas
of equal protection doctrine. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1989) (suggesting that the intent requirement “allocates []
burdens [of proof between the individual and the state] differently in different contexts”);
see also id. at 1119, 1119–35 (noting that in “jury selection, voting, and education cases,”
the Court allows “individuals to establish [] inferences [of discriminatory motivation] . . .
with something close to a showing of discriminatory impact”); see also Betrall L. Ross II,
The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent
Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 191–97 (2012). Thus, it would be incorrect to say that
the Court has always shown insensitivity to context in crafting and applying the Davis rule.
Even so, as the crack-cocaine cases illustrate, some areas of equal protection doctrine still
adhere strictly to the letter of Davis, and within these areas, the threat of cross-remedial
spillover remains.
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a case brings itself to bear on an unresolved question of statutory
interpretation, thus creating precedent that governs within both remedial
settings.
The distortions can run in both directions. Consider first what
Professor Lawrence Solan calls “statutory inflation.”52 As he explains,
“[d]eeply entrenched in our system of statutory jurisprudence are two
complementary canons of construction: Remedial statutes are interpreted
liberally; penal statutes are interpreted narrowly.”53 Consequentially, for
hybrid statutes, when interpretive questions first manifest themselves in the
civil setting, courts might end up favoring “broad interpretations” that then
“spill over to criminal cases, causing an increase in criminal liability.”54
Put another way, interpretations that courts might have rejected in standalone criminal cases still find their way into the criminal setting, via crossremedial spillover of an earlier civil holding that broadens the applicability
of a hybrid statute.55
Solan highlights several examples of statutory inflation. Consider,
for instance, insider-trading regulation under federal securities law. Neither
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act nor SEC Rule 10b-5 makes explicit

52

Solan, supra note ?, at 2213.
Id. at 2211–12.
54
Id. at 2213. Or, courts might apply Chevron deference to an agency’s broad
interpretation of a hybrid statute in a civil action and then abide by that interpretation in a
subsequent criminal case. See Solan, supra note ?, at 2214 (“Although the application of
the Chevron doctrine is consistent with the broad interpretation of remedial statutes, if
Congress also decides to criminalize the willful violation of regulations, statutory inflation
is likely to occur.”).
55
For those who view the rule of lenity as grounded entirely in fair-notice values,
statutory inflation may seem unproblematic. If a civil holding endorses a broad
interpretation of a hybrid statute at Time A, then future criminal defendants should be able
to anticipate that the Time A interpretation will govern their prosecution at Time B. Put
another way, as long as the “inflating” civil holding precedes the “inflated” criminal
holding, and as long as everyone understands that judicial interpretations of hybrid statutes
apply uniformly across both civil and criminal cases, then everyone should get fair notice.
The problem, however, is that the rule of lenity may safeguard more than just the value of
fair notice. It might, for instance, reflect concerns about the liberty-infringing effects of
criminal punishments, cf. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)
(characterizing the rule as “founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals”), safeguard values of legislative primacy, see Lawrence M. Solan, Law,
Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 141–43 (1998), or serve the useful
“structural” purpose of “compel[ling] legislatures to detail the breadth of prohibitions in
advance of their enforcement” and “compelling prosecutors to charge crimes with enough
specificity to indicate to voters—and juries—what conduct has been treated as criminal,”
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity As a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 887
(2004). Under these and other accounts of the lenity rule, statutory inflation remains worth
worrying about.
53
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reference to insider trading.56 Nevertheless, in Chiarella v. United States,
the Supreme Court deemed this practice criminally punishable under these
laws.57 In Chiarella, however, the Court was not writing on a blank slate.
Instead, its ruling in the case derived from a decade’s worth of
“administrative decisions and circuit court decisions,” all of which had
involved private and administrative requests for civil relief.58 In citing to
these cases, the Court in Chiarella never paused to ask whether the criminal
nature of the case before it warranted a different interpretive approach.59
Consequently, as Solan explains, “criminal application of Rule 10b-5 in the
context of insider trading grew out of the broad interpretation of the rule in
civil cases, in part as the result of aggressive administrative enforcement
actions brought earlier by the SEC.”60
Hybrid statutes are just as susceptible to “deflationary”
interpretations as they are to “inflationary” ones. Consider United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co.61 In this case, an arms dealer sought a refund of
a $200 tax levy, the validity of which turned on the meaning of the term
“firearm” as used in the National Firearms Act (“NFA”). A plurality of
Justices resolved the statutory ambiguity by invoking the rule of lenity,
even though the case before them was civil rather than criminal. Justice
Souter’s plurality opinion justified this move by pointing to the hybrid
nature of the NFA. As he explained, “although it is a tax statute that we
construe now in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal applications that carry
no additional requirement of willfulness.”62 Framed as a rule of substantive
law, Thompson’s interpretive holding would inevitably control in both civil
and criminal cases. And for that reason, the plurality opted for a narrow
interpretation of the statutory language, thus accommodating (albeit
preemptively) the rule-of-lenity concerns that criminal cases might one day
56

15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013); Solan, supra note ?, at 2238.
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
58
See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)
(emphasizing that “the securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the
common law both to effectuate the broad remedial design of Congress and to insure
uniformity of enforcement” (internal citations omitted)).
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As Solan emphasizes, the Court in Chiarella “certainly did not consider the rule of
lenity.” Solan, supra note ?, at 2239.
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Solan, supra note ?, at 2239–40. See also Transcript, Roundtable on Insider
Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory After O’Hagan, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 7, 15 (1998)
(statement of Professor Roberta Karmel) (discussing this problem in similar terms).
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504 U.S. 595 (1992). For illuminating discussions of Thompson, see Solan, supra
note ?, at 2253–55; Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of
Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1036; and Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA.
TAX. REV. 920–21 (2007).
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raise.
The Court in Thompson thus managed to head off the sort of
statutory inflation that Chiarella reflects. But rather than prevent spillover
from happening, the decision simply diverted that spillover in a different
direction. Since Thompson was a civil case, the rule of lenity would not
normally have come into play. It was only the prospect of future criminal
proceedings, based on the same statutory language, that triggered the
Court’s invocation of the lenity rule. In that sense, the Thompson plurality
chose to “deflate” rather than “inflate.” It artificially constricted the scope
of the statute in a civil case so as to adopt what it viewed as the proper
interpretation for criminal cases.
D. Trial Errors and Appellate Reversal
Under the law of harmless error, appellate courts may excuse certain
trial errors as nonprejudicial. Some errors, however, are not subject to
harmless error analysis. These errors, known as “structural errors,” trigger a
rule of automatic reversal; no instance of structural error may be excused as
harmless, regardless of its real-world impact.
Commentators have suggested that the automatic reversal remedy
induces courts to define structural rights narrowly.63 It is costly to reverse
convictions and to have new trials below, so appellate courts will therefore
be reluctant to impose these costs on lower courts for alleged errors that
strike them as minor. When judges feel this way about non-structural
errors, they are often able to uphold convictions on grounds of
harmlessness, reasoning that even though errors occurred below, they were
not prejudicial enough to warrant full-scale appellate relief. With structural
errors, however, the harmless error option is unavailable, so that the only
way not to reverse is to hold that no error occurred in the first place. It is
this dynamic that may render appellate courts less inclined to recognize
structural errors, for which reversal is mandatory, than non-structural errors,
for which the harmless-error release valve is at least sometimes available.
In this way, the automatic reversal rule may end up diluting, rather than
strengthening, structural protections.
But so what? Perhaps it is just an unchangeable fact of the world
that appeals court judges are disinclined to reverse convictions on supposed
“technicalities.” And, from the perspective of a criminal defendant, whether
appellate judges avoid reversals by declaring that no error occurred or by
63

Levinson, supra note ?, at 891 (“Automatic reversal is obviously a rather severe
remedy for any criminal case”); Shepard, supra note ?, at 1183 (highlighting examples of
cases in which courts have “weakened” structural rights “to avoid applying the drastic
remedy of automatic reversal”).
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declaring that an error was harmless, seems beside the point. From a
broader societal perspective, moreover, the difference may also seem to be
of little consequence. True, making harmless error analysis available for
structural claims would lessen the pressure on judges to define the
substantive law narrowly. But permitting judges to deem one-time
structural errors as harmless ones would also result in the denial of the
reversal remedy to some defendants who might have prevailed under a prostructural-error regime. The right would expand while the remedy
contracted, with the sum availability of appellate relief remaining much the
same.
This analysis of the structural error doctrine, however, overlooks its
distinctively problematic spillover effects. The difficulty is that the rightslimiting effect of the automatic reversal remedy feeds back into trial court
resolution of structural claims. In contrast to appellate courts, which resolve
claims of trial error after the fact, trial courts resolve most claims as they
arise. Consequently, the remedial consequences of recognizing an error at
trial are less severe than doing so on appeal. If, for instance, a trial court
finds that testimony violates a hearsay rule, it can simply strike the
testimony from the record. If it finds that physical evidence was unlawfully
obtained, it can prohibit introduction of the evidence. If it finds that a juror
has behaved improperly, it can replace that juror with an alternate. In each
of these instances, the substantive error gets remediated without significant
disruption to the case itself. For the appellate judge, however, these same
errors point to one and only one remedial option: reversing the conviction
outright, so as to require an entirely new trial.
Thus we encounter another instance of cross-remedial spillover.
When the high remedial costs of automatic reversal prompt an appellate
court to declare that no trial error occurred, the appellate court creates
precedents that trial courts must follow, even though trial courts operate in a
setting where the same claims of error are far less costly to vindicate.
Considerations specific to the remedial request for appellate reversal, in
other words, threaten to produce a weaker set of legal protections than what
trial court judges might otherwise be willing to endorse.
Consider Batson v. Kentucky’s prohibition on race-based
peremptory challenges. Batson errors are structural errors, mandating
automatic reversal on appeal.64 This state of affairs has likely narrowed the
scope of Batson protections, with appellate courts, in Professor Pamela
Karlan’s words, “surreptitiously redefin[ing] the right” to avoid the costly

64

The Supreme Court has never expressly declared that Batson errors are structural,
but lower courts have unanimously characterized them as such. See Jason Mazzone,
Batson Remedies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1618 n.28 (2012).
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remedy of automatic reversal and full-scale retrials.65 But remediating
Batson errors at trial is cheap; the judge need only respond to a violation by
prohibiting the exclusion of a challenged juror, or empaneling a new jury
before the trial begins.66 Left to their own devices, then, trial courts might
give Batson more bite than appellate courts have accorded it. Instead, these
courts must take their guidance from their appellate-court counterparts, who
adjudicate Batson claims in connection with high-cost remedial requests.67
Another example involves the Sixth Amendment right to public
trial. Most appellate courts regard this right as structural,68 meaning that
they cannot avoid automatic reversals by invoking the harmless error rule.
Perhaps for this reason, several courts have grafted a “triviality exception”
onto the right itself.69 Thus, as the D.C. Circuit has explained, even
unjustified exclusions of the public from trial-level proceedings may not
violate the Constitution, so long as these closures do not infringe the
“values served by the Sixth Amendment.”70 Although the court has insisted
that applying this triviality exception does not equate to conducting
harmless error analysis,71 the two tests operate in similar ways. Both seek
to screen out Sixth Amendment harms of insufficient severity to warrant
reversal of a conviction on appeal. Nevertheless, a non-trivial difference
marks the two rules. Unlike the harmless error doctrine, which governs
only the availability of the reversal remedy, the “triviality exception”
governs the availability of all potential remedies linked to the public trial
right. Thus, for example, if a trial judge realizes that members of the public
were improperly excluded from a portion of voir dire proceedings, the
65

Karlan, supra note ?, at 2020.
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 500 (1998) (“There will always be a reluctance to reverse a
conviction because the costs of retrying any case are high. Trial court actors, not faced
with those costs, can actually afford to be more singleminded in their devotion to the
Constitution—if they want to be.”). For a survey and discussion of the various ways in
which trial judges have remediated Batson violations, see Mazzone, supra note ?, at ?.
67
There is, to be sure, some play in the joints here. Citing Professor Karlan’s work,
Daryl Levinson has suggested that, in fact, “the Batson right as applied by trial judges, with
a mild remedy, is significantly more expansive than the Batson right as applied by
appellate judges, with a severe remedy.” Levinson, supra note ?, at ?. If correct, such data
would reveal that Batson law has been unknowingly disaggregated across the trial-court
and appeals-court remedial contexts, with the former adhering to a more robust version of
the doctrine than the latter. Even so, the data would not disprove the existence of crossremedial spillover; perhaps trial judges are still enforcing the Batson right less generously
than they would be in the absence of the appellate court guidance they currently receive.
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Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984).
69
See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Peterson v.
Williams, 85 F.3d 39 (1996).
70
Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43.
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See id. at 42.
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triviality exception might justify her decision not to redo jury selection. In
making that decision, however, the judge would be applying a standard that
appellate courts had developed in the interest of preserving convictions after
the fact.72
E. Probable Cause and the Exclusionary Remedy
What about the exclusionary rule? Suppression motions can make
or break a criminal prosecution, with success for the defendant often
meaning that an obviously culpable criminal goes free.73 While many
commentators have criticized this aspect of the exclusionary rule as
resulting in the over-protection of Fourth Amendment rights,74 others have
attacked it for doing precisely the opposite. “Judges,” as Professor Akhil
Amar has explained, “do not like excluding bloody knives.”75
Consequently, when asked to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds, they find ways to “distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth
Amendment was not really violated.”76 Other scholars have echoed this
concern,77 and some judges have themselves recognized this play of cause
and effect.78 Drawing on his own experience on the federal bench, for
72

This claim depends on the assumption that trial court judges care more about getting
the law right than they do about ensuring their judgments don’t get reversed on appeal.
Otherwise, a “triviality exception” to the public trial rule would render our hypothetical
judge no more inclined to remediate a minor infringement of the right than would a rule
providing for harmless error analysis on appeal. To a purely results-oriented judge, both a
triviality exception to the right and a harmless error exception to the remedy reduce the
likelihood of reversal on appeal, and neither rule would therefore motivate the judge to
remediate a public trial violation immediately after it occurred. But for judges, who seek
compliance with the substantive law for its own sake, the impact of an exception to the
public trial right would be more pronounced than an exception to the reversal remedy on
appeal.
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People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.).
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Id. (suggesting that, under an exclusionary regime, “protection for the individual
would . . . be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society”).
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Amar, supra note ?, at 799.
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Id.
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Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application
of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 959–66 (1983); Jack Wade Nowlin,
The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and
Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017 (2012);
Leong, supra note ?, at 431; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural
Reform Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1407 (2007); Tonja Jacobi, The Law and
Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 656–60 (2011).
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Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 76 (1992) (drawing on
survey responses from judges and lawyers to suggest that “that judges in Chicago often
knowingly credit police perjury and distort the meaning of the law to prevent the
suppression of evidence and assure conviction”).
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example, Judge Guido Calabresi has stated that the exclusionary rule “has
been the reason for more diminutions in privacy protection than anything
else going on today”79
In addition to judges’ visceral (and some would say understandable)
reluctance to grant remedial windfalls, the suppression remedy presents a
further deterrent to the recognition of Fourth Amendment violations:
hindsight bias. If judges are like the rest of us, then they will have a hard
time preventing their ex post knowledge about the outcome of a search from
affecting what is supposed to be an ex ante inquiry into its lawfulness.80
And that poses an especially acute problem in criminal cases, where the
only searches that come up for Fourth Amendment review have already
yielded incriminating evidence.81 Try as judges might to ignore the fact of
a search’s success, they may still sometimes succumb to hindsight bias in
asking whether agents had probable cause to conduct the search in the first
place. In Professor William Stuntz’s words, “It must be much harder for a
judge to decide that an officer had something less than probable cause to
believe cocaine was in the trunk of a defendant’s car when the cocaine was
in fact there.”82 And if that is so, the suppression remedy will produce a
narrowed set of Fourth Amendment protections, especially where probable
cause determinations are involved.
An oft-cited cost of these phenomena is the underdeterrence of
police misconduct. The longer the exclusionary remedy remains the
primary means of Fourth Amendment enforcement, the more littered with
loopholes the right will become, and law enforcement officers will become
freer to impinge on individual privacy interests. But there is a further cost
79

Calabresi, supra note ?, at 112.
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreword: The Death of Probable Cause, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (Summer 2010), at iix (“Ample psychological theory and empirical data,
albeit mostly in other contexts, supports the idea that hindsight bias is at work in the
probable cause determination”); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 802–04 (2001) (finding experimental
evidence of hindsight bias in judges’ assessment of hypothetical Rule 11 sanctions issue);
Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, The Tort Remedy in Search and
Seizure Cases: A Case Study in Juror Decision Making, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 279, 299
(1988) (finding evidence of hindsight bias in test jurors’ assessment of hypothetical
searches). But see Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlninski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Can
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J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Probable Cause, Probability, and
Hindsight, Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 11-25 (July 2011) (similar),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1877125.
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as well, which involves cross-remedial spillover in Fourth Amendment
lawmaking. The exclusionary rule is not the only mechanism for enforcing
Fourth Amendment rights. Litigants may also raise Fourth Amendment
claims in connection with requests for prospective or monetary relief. In
addition, magistrate judges review warrant applications before deciding
whether or not to authorize a search. Cross-remedial application of Fourth
Amendment law might well expose these remedial environments to the
right-limiting influences of the exclusionary rule.
Consider, for instance, the interplay between after-the-fact
suppression hearings and before-the-fact evaluations of warrant
applications. Warrant proceedings do not present all of the rightsconstricting tendencies that affect after-the-fact decisions about the
exclusionary remedy. Ex ante review of a search warrant application raises
only the attenuated possibility that denying the warrant at that time will
preclude the government from later prosecuting a criminal—the reviewer,
after all, does not know whether the search will bear fruit (or whether some
later investigatory effort will turn up the evidence in any event)—whereas
ex post review of a suppression motion presents the certainty that
invalidating the search means withholding inculpatory evidence from a
jury’s eyes. For this reason, as Professor Stuntz once surmised, it may well
be that in unsettled areas of law, “magistrates apply a higher standard to
warrant applications before the fact than do judges in suppression hearings
after the fact.”83 But it also must be, that once the law is settled, appellate
and trial judges will apply the same settled law—settled law that comes
from the hands of appellate courts that act with the exclusion of evidence in
mind. In other words, magistrate judges’ probable cause determinations
must comport with Fourth Amendment precedents their superiors have
created, and these precedents often involve requests to suppress probative
evidence. The remedy-specific influences of the exclusionary rule,
combined with the cross-remedial uniformity of Fourth Amendment law,
would thus render magistrates’ review of warrants less rights-protective
than they otherwise would and should be.
That, in any event, is the prima facie case for attributing crossremedial spillover effects to the exclusionary rule. But the case requires
some hedging, for two reasons. To begin, and as I will discuss further in
Parts III and IV, the remedial and substantive rules in the Fourth
Amendment context have already developed some safeguards against
spillover. The Supreme Court, for instance, has carved out various
exceptions to the exclusionary remedy, which, framed in terms of the
remedy rather than the right, allow courts to deny exclusionary relief
83
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without affecting Fourth Amendment protections in other remedial settings.
Thus, while the exclusionary rule is theoretically capable of generating
cross-remedial spillover effects, the law of evidentiary exclusion may have
evolved to a point at which cross-remedial spillover no longer presents a
serious problem.
Second, it may be incorrect to presume that magistrate judges who
review warrant applications ex ante would develop a stricter set of probable
cause requirements if left to their own devices. To be sure, the ex ante
warrant application process does not raise the specter of hindsight bias, and
it also involves a “remedy” (namely the denial of a warrant application) that
imposes fewer costs on the government than the outright suppression of
evidence. (In particular, denial of a search warrant does not free a criminal
defendant; it simply causes law enforcement officers to develop a stronger
evidentiary basis for their suspicions.) At the same time, the warrantapplication setting may present its own set of rights-deterring forces. Most
importantly, these proceedings are ex parte affairs, with repeat-players on
the government side arguing unopposed for the granting of a warrant
application.84 In addition, officers may sometimes file warrant applications
in the course of urgent, high-pressure investigations, in which even a oneoff denial might preclude the government from obtaining valuable evidence
or preventing a dangerous suspect from doing further harm.85 In these
circumstances, even marginally meritorious warrant applications would
enjoy a high likelihood of success, perhaps even more so than government
attempts to defeat suppression motions ex post. For all of its supposed
hostility to Fourth Amendment rights, then, post-search decisions involving
the exclusionary remedy may be more conducive to the recognition of
Fourth Amendment protections than a magistrate’s review of warrant
applications. And, if that is so, then the exclusionary remedy would not be
responsible for causing, via spillover, an artificial narrowing of magistratelevel Fourth Amendment law.
With these two caveats in mind, however, it still seems fair to say
that the remedy-specific forces of the suppression-hearing context might
sometimes render judges considering suppression motions less likely to
vindicate Fourth Amendment rights ex post than judges considering warrant
applications ex ante. And, in any event, even if the exclusionary remedy
does not cause major spillover problems within the warrant-application
context, it may still artificially constrict the availability of other Fourth
Amendment remedies, such as monetary and prospective relief for the
84
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victims of unlawful searches and seizures. In sum, spillover problems
caused by the exclusionary remedy at least present a risk worth attending to.
As long as the exclusionary remedy remains the primary means of enforcing
Fourth Amendment protections, and insofar as the Fourth Amendment right
applies uniformly across remedial contexts, the rights-weakening forces
associated with the exclusionary remedy will threaten to blunt the impact of
the Fourth Amendment in cases that have nothing to do with the
suppression of evidence.
F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Doctrinal Borrowing
The preceding examples have illustrated cross-remedial spillover
occurring within single discrete areas of doctrine. Yet similar forms of
spillover can also occur as a result of explicit acts of doctrinal “borrowing.”
This practice, as Professors Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai have defined it,
occurs when courts “import doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal
elements from one area of constitutional law into another for persuasive
ends.”86 The basic idea is straightforward: When separate doctrinal
domains confront analogous problems, courts can reference their prior work
from one domain to facilitate their present work in another. And this
process can give rise to spillover across remedies.
Consider, for instance, the relationship between the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and state-based attorney
malpractice law. In Polk County v. Dodson, the Supreme Court foreclosed
the use of civil § 1983 actions to remediate Sixth Amendment violations by
state public defenders, thus effectively channeling all federal ineffective
assistance adjudication to collateral attacks on final criminal convictions.87
Consequently, Sixth Amendment case law has evolved in close association
with the habeas remedy itself, with considerations of finality and interstate
comity exerting a powerful influence on courts’ disposition of ineffective
assistance claims. Simply put, courts often conflate the substantive validity
of an individual’s ineffective assistance claim with the remedial propriety of
granting habeas relief. 88
86

Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
461 (2010).
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See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (prohibiting the use of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to remedy ineffective assistance claims against public defenders); see also Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (holding that an ineffective assistance claim arising
from federal convictions may be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 regardless of whether it
could have been raised on direct appeal).
88
For instance, the Court in Strickland v. Washington defended its adoption of a
“prejudice” requirement for ineffective assistance claims by explaining that the
nonprejudicial errors would not undermine third-party “reliance on the outcome of the
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Standing alone, none of this is necessarily problematic. Dodson has
effectively isolated ineffective assistance litigation to the habeas context, so
Sixth Amendment adjudication presents no other remedial regime for the
remedy-specific influences of the habeas remedy to spill over into. With no
other remedies on the table, it makes no difference (from the spillover
perspective) whether courts channel their reluctance to grant relief into
substantive Sixth Amendment doctrine, or into remedy-specific rules of
habeas doctrine. For even if remedy-specific influences end up affecting
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right, very few (if any) Sixth
Amendment cases will arise in which these remedy-specific influences
won’t already be present.
Nevertheless, spillover has arisen as a result of state courts’ decision
to “borrow” from the constitutional ineffective assistance standard in
shaping their own standards of attorney malpractice liability.89 This act of
borrowing, some have argued, unfairly stacks the deck against malpractice
plaintiffs. Federal ineffective assistance claims virtually always arise in
connection with collateral attacks on criminal convictions. And in these
contexts, as one commentator has pointed out, “[t]he institutional and
societal interest in the finality of convictions may create a reluctance to
reverse a conviction even where the awarding of damages would be
appropriate.”90 In this way, the “borrowing” of constitutional effective
assistance doctrine within state malpractice law creates undesirable
spillover, rendering malpractice law more disadvantageous to plaintiffs than
it otherwise would be.91 Even though nominally separate substantive
proceeding,” 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). It also rejected an alternative standard as
“inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently
serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding,” id. at 693 (emphasis
added). These and other aspects of the Strickland decision have led some commentators to
characterize it as conflating questions of right and remedy. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear,
Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effective Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme Court
Intervention, 25 FED. SENT. R. 110 (2012) (characterizing Strickland “as part of the line of
habeas cases that were intended to minimize meddling by federal courts with state court
judgments (especially death sentences).”); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal,
Conceding Guilt, 23 FALL CRIM. JUST. 57, 58 (2008) (suggesting that in Strickland “the
contours of a violation of rights and the question of remedy bec[a]me confused”).
89
For example, some states apply claim preclusion rules that prohibit the bringing of
malpractice claims against attorneys whose conduct has already withstood a Strickland
challenge in a criminal case. See generally Meredith J. Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A
Lawyer’s Holiday, 37 GA. L. REV. 1251, 1270–71 (2002); Susan M. Treyz, Note, Criminal
Malpractice: Privilege of the Innocent Plaintiff?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 720 (1991).
90
Treyz, supra note ?, at 721; see also Duncan, supra note ?, at 1271 (“Although there
is obviously value in the preservation of judicial resources, courts are wrong in concluding
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims and criminal malpractice claims require
equivalent findings in every instance.”).
91
Nor does “spillover” occur exclusively across remedial boundaries; indeed, the
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domains, constitutional ineffective assistance standards and common law
malpractice standards have begun to merge into a single substantive
standard with cross-remedial scope.
***
Remedial law and substantive law, as we have seen, are
interdependent; the former dictates not just the real-world efficacy of the
latter, but also, to a large extent, its shape and scope. That reality, in my
view, is inevitable—and not necessarily unfortunate. As a conceptual
matter, it is hard to think about rights apart from the real-world
consequences of their existence.92 Further, the interplay between remedyrelated variables and rights-related decisions often makes sense.93 Some
scholars, for instance, applaud the rule of lenity, citing the particular
dynamics of the criminal setting as a legitimate reason to construe criminal
statutes narrowly.94 More controversially, one might applaud, or at least
refrain from condemning, judges’ contraction of substantive constitutional
protections in response to exclusionary remedy. If indeed it is undesirable
to let the “criminal . . . go free because the constable blundered,” some level
of substantive narrowing may be an appropriate response to an especially
phenomenon will arise any time contextual factors affect the definition of doctrinal rules
that govern when these contextual factors are absent. “Spillover across space” might
occur, for instance, when constitutional rights are defined in cases involving state
government, but then govern in subsequent cases involving the federal government, see,
e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 189 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (worrying that the Court
had “dilute[d] a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of ‘incorporation,’ the ‘jotfor-jot and case-for-case’ application of the federal right to the States, with the reality of
federalism.”); see also See Marc D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring
Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005). Or “spillover across
time” might occur when stare decisis causes a holding from Time A to maintain operative
effect at a later Time B, at which point the holding might no longer make sense. See, e.g.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 413 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(advocating for a relaxation of stare decisis principles in the face of changed
circumstances, so as to ensure that ““this court . . . bring its opinions into agreement with
experience and with facts newly ascertained”). Some of what this Article has to say about
the spillover problem as applied to cross-remedial rules might then carry implications for
cognate forms of spillover within other areas of the law.
92
See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678–79 (1983) (“The
prospect of actualizing rights through a remedy . . . makes it inevitable that thoughts of
remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges’ minds will shuttle back and forth between
right and remedy.”).
93
Cf. Fallon [Va. L. Rev.], supra note ?, at 692 (concluding that “there should be no
normative objection to courts openly seeking to achieve the optimal balance of merits,
justiciability, and remedial doctrines as long as they deal responsibly with such legally
pertinent considerations as the constitutional text and judicial precedent”).
94
See, e.g., Price, supra note ?, at 910–25; Solan, supra note ?, at 59–60.
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potent constitutional remedy.95
These points suggest that the project of trying to stop remedies from
affecting the shaping of substantive law is a non-starter. It does not follow,
however, that we should ignore the phenomenon altogether. To the
contrary, precisely because remedies influence the shape of rights, courts
must consider the types of substantive outcomes that particular remedial
regimes favor. And that is especially so when substantive norms are
defined in multiple remedial regimes, such that the remedy-specific
influences of one regime stand ready to spill over into another.
II.

NON-DISAGGREGATION RESPONSES

Cross-remedial spillover occurs when two things happen: first, a
remedial environment influences the definition of a substantive rule; and,
second, the same substantive rule carries force in a different remedial
environment. Efforts to mitigate spillover must therefore target at least one
of these two events. That is, courts can combat spillover either by
calibrating the ways in which remedial dynamics affect the definition and
implementation of a given substantive rule, or by varying their application
of substantive rules across different remedial domains.
This Section identifies and evaluates strategies of the first variety,
which aim to reduce spillover across remedies without in any way affecting
the cross-remedial uniformity of substantive legal norms. I focus in
particular on three such strategies, which I call (1) “all-contexts” rights
adjudication; (2) “remedial equalizing”; and (3) “remedial diversifying.” All
three strategies, we will see, are capable of reducing spillover across
remedies, by mitigating the extent to which a single remedy distorts the
cross-remedial application of substantive norms. We will also see, however,
that all three strategies suffer from significant weaknesses, owing largely to
their inability to accommodate substantive variation across remedial lines.
A. “All Contexts” Rights Adjudication
One anti-spillover strategy begins with a call for increased judicial
awareness of the potential for the spillover problem to happen. The number
one evil, on this view, is the judge who adjudicates substantive claims while
wearing remedial blinders—focusing only on the particular remedial
request before her without considering how the substantive law she creates
will operate in other remedial settings. We thus improve the spillover
situation by directing judges’ attention to it; the hope is that a greater
95
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mindfulness of spillover across remedies will lead to reductions in its
occurrence.
This idea has gained traction in the literature on hybrid statutes.
After recognizing the “core principle” that the meaning of hybrid statutes
must remain fixed across varying remedial contexts,96 Professor Margaret
Sachs has encouraged courts to abide by what she calls the “all contexts”
rule:
In deciding upon the single interpretation [of a hybrid
statute] courts should not focus solely on the immediate
enforcement context. Rather, they should apply the all
contexts rule, which requires them to consider every action
to enforce the prohibition under the hybrid statute and the
policies pertinent to each.97
This strategy is reflected in Justice Souter’s plurality opinion in
Thompson. Recognizing the National Firearms Act’s potential applicability
in criminal proceedings, Justice Souter invoked the rule of lenity to resolve
an interpretive ambiguity, even though the immediate case before him
presented a request for civil relief.98 The Thompson plurality, in other
words, interpreted the statute with all remedial contexts in mind. It did not
let the remedial particulars of the case interfere with its resolution of a
cross-remedial substantive question.
Although Professor Sachs’s argument applies to hybrid statutes, we
could extend the “all contexts” principle to other doctrinal areas in which
spillover occurs. For instance, we might criticize the Court in Washington
v. Davis for failing to consider how a discriminatory purpose requirement
would play out in the criminal setting, just as we might criticize the Court in
Paul v. Davis for failing to consider how its “stigma-plus” rule would play
out beyond the confines of constitutional tort cases. In these and other
cases, the critical error takes the form of a judicial failure to appreciate the
cross-remedial nature of the rules being crafted. When judges define rules
that traverse remedial boundaries, they ought at least not pretend to be
doing otherwise.
But the “all contexts” approach hardly offers a panacea for
spillover-related difficulties. For one thing, the rule seems ill-equipped to
96

See Sachs, supra note ?, at 1031; see also FCC v. Am. Broadcasting Corp., 347 U.S.
284, 290 (1994) (noting, with respect to civil and criminal enforcement of a hybrid statute,
that “[t]here cannot be one construction for the [FCC] and another for the Department of
Justice”).
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Id.
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Thompson, 594 U.S. at 617.

34

Spillover Across Remedies

[14-Aug-13

handle the variety of subtle ways in which remedies influence the shaping
of substantive law. Many of the examples we encountered in Part I reveal
remedial particularities that exert a quiet, unconsidered effect on courts’
adjudication of rights-related claims. When that is the case, a renewed
commitment to all-contexts rights adjudication does not seem likely to
ameliorate the initial distortions that remedies are creating. Telling courts
when and when not to apply the rule of lenity is one thing; but telling them
when and when not to suffer from hindsight bias—or when not to blanch at
the prospect of reversing a conviction for structural error—is altogether
different.99 These tendencies are hardwired into human psychology.
Trying to consider “all remedial contexts” in the face of these impulses
seems no less futile than trying not to feel them in the first place.
A second and more severe shortcoming with the “all contexts”
strategy lies in its inability to mediate between the competing needs of
different remedial domains. We saw in our earlier analysis of Thompson
that the plurality’s resolution of the issue was in one sense unsatisfactory; it
did account for all remedial contexts, but only in a way that favored the
remedial influences of the criminal context over the civil context. That fact
should not surprise us, because the plurality was trying to adopt a one-sizefits-all solution for two very different remedial domains. As long as rightsbased law must apply uniformly across remedial contexts, this same basic
problem will arise. Suppose, for instance, that having considered all
remedial contexts, the Court in Washington v. Davis concluded that a
discriminatory purpose requirement was inapt for criminal proceedings but
apt for civil proceedings. What then? Either the Court would have to stick
to its guns and adopt a discriminatory purpose requirement, notwithstanding
the requirement’s clumsy fit with criminal equal protection claims, or it
would have to discard the discriminatory purpose requirement and initiate
the parade of horribles in civil cases over which the majority lost so much
sleep. Openly embracing the all-contexts approach would at least have
allowed the Court to choose between the lesser of these two evils. But
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For example, I earlier suggested that the exclusionary remedy artificially reduces the
degree to which magistrate judges enforce Fourth Amendment rights at probable cause
hearings. See Section I.E supra. The mechanism is straightforward: (1) circumstances
unique to suppression hearings deter the finding of Fourth Amendment violations by trial
and appellate judges; and (2) magistrate judges, operating in the absence of the rightscontracting features of suppression hearings, must nonetheless take their cues from the very
same doctrines their superiors have crafted. This is an area where “all contexts” rights
adjudication seems unlikely to solve the spillover problem. The deterrent forces of the
exclusionary remedy are powerful and difficult to resist, so merely exhorting trial and
appellate judges to ignore hindsight bias and to lighten up on criminal defendants will not
much improve the situation.
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doing so would not have made the evils go away.100
B. Remedy Equalizing
A second response to the spillover problem might involve the
manipulation of remedies themselves. When one remedial rule produces
significant substantive distortions in other remedial settings, courts could
mitigate spillover effects by looking to the structure of the remedy on which
that rule is based. If the particularities of one remedial environment are
interfering with a right’s application in another, then courts could make
changes to one (or more) of the environments themselves, so as to equalize
their effects on the definition of substantive norms.
Assume, for instance, that within Fourth Amendment law, the
exclusionary remedy causes unwanted spillover into other domains where
the pressures against vindicating substantive claims are less intense. In
response to this problem, we could simply replace the exclusionary remedy
with something more modest. We could, for instance, introduce a regime
that channels all Fourth Amendment claims into damages actions under
Bivens and § 1983;101 we could replace the exclusionary remedy it with an
administrative damages remedy;102 we could replace it with a sentencing
reduction remedy;103 we could replace it with enforcement by an internal
ombudsman;104 and so forth.105 In comparison to the exclusionary remedy,
these and other alternative remedies might less severely deter the judicial
recognition of Fourth Amendment violations.
Consequently, such
replacement remedies would do less cross-remedial damage to Fourth
Amendment law, evening out—to some extent—the effects on substantive
Fourth Amendment law that each applicable Fourth Amendment remedy
exerts. This could all be done, moreover, while maintaining absolute
uniformity within the substantive law itself. The same Fourth Amendment
100

Professor Sachs herself has noted that the “all-contexts” strategy requires will often
require compromise of one form or another. See Sachs, supra note ?, at 1034–35 (noting
that the “policies pertinent to” different remedial regimes can sometimes “conflict”, and
that when that is the case, “courts should seek the most appropriate compromise”).
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See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note ?, at 405–18; L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell
Caldwell, Carol A. Chase & Ronald W. Fagan, If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 743–55 (1998).
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See, e.g., Amar, supra note ?, at 812–15;
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See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note ?, at 116–18.
104
See, e.g., Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman as a Substitute for
the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEX. TECH L. REV. 317 (1973); Robert P. Davidow,
Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982).
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See, e.g., Barnett, supra note ?, at 969–80 (restitutionary damages remedy); Ronald
J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations as Direct
Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241 (2010).
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law would apply regardless of whether a claimant sought damages,
injunctions, sentencing reductions, and so forth. But spillover would still
abate as a result of our remedial reforms. No longer would one Fourth
Amendment remedy exert disproportionately constricting effects on the
law’s application within other remedial contexts; instead, Fourth
Amendment adjudication would occur against the backdrop of remedial
regimes with more or less equivalent effects on substantive outcomes.
Here’s another example of how the equalizing strategy might work:
I earlier suggested that appellate judges will be less likely to identify
“structural” trial errors on appeal in comparison to trial-level judges
evaluating structural claims as they arise. The culprit here is the reversal
remedy, which renders after-the-fact remediation of a structural error far
more costly than contemporaneous remediation of the same error at the trial
level. That being so, Congress could provide for guaranteed interlocutory
review of all trial-court rulings on structural claims. Appellate court judges
would then confront allegations of structural error in a remedial
environment similar to the one that prevails in the trial court setting.
Recognizing structural error on appeal would no longer mean vacating the
outcome of a completed trial; rather, it would mean reversing only a
particular order issued before a trial has concluded. Again, the reform
might help to “equalize” remedial influences on the rights and thereby
lessen the extent of spillover from one remedial setting to another.
Even more extreme versions of this strategy might strive to isolate
the adjudication of substantive norm within one and only one remedial
setting. Congress, for instance, could stop passing hybrid statutes, choosing
between civil or criminal penalties as the sole enforcement mechanism for
each new substantive norm it enshrines. Courts could wipe out civil rights
tort law, by abolishing the Bivens action or overruling Monroe v. Pape,106
thus in effect relegating the enforcement of constitutional rights solely to
“defensive” remedies invoked during government-initiated proceedings.
Congress could jettison the right to an appeal from criminal convictions,
reasoning that trial-level rights adjudication would thereby become less
vulnerable to interference from the remedy-specific influences of appellate
review. And so forth.
By now it should be obvious that a “remedy equalizing” strategy
would mitigate spillover in a highly problematic fashion. Many objectives
can, do, and should factor into the design of remedial rules, and only one of
these objectives is the reduction of spillover across remedies. Remedies,
after all, do not exist merely for the sake of influencing courts’ outlook on
substantive issues; they serve the primary purpose of operationalizing and
106

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961).
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enforcing the substantive law on the ground. Thus, even when concerns
about spillover might tempt us to scrap one remedial regime in favor of
another, countervailing considerations might favor a very different
approach. Mandatory interlocutory appeals for claims of structural error,
for instance, might well reduce the extent of spillover that the post-trial
reversal remedy brings about. But it would also lengthen the life spans of
criminal prosecutions, complicating the prompt presentation of witness
testimony and generating extra judicial work. In similar fashion, some
alternatives to the exclusionary remedy—even if less likely to stir up
spillover effects—might be less effective at deterring law enforcement
officers from violating core Fourth Amendment guarantees. Are the
benefits to be gained from spillover reduction worth the costs to be incurred
from weakened Fourth Amendment enforcement? That’s the sort of
question we should ask when considering whether to pursue large-scale
abandonment of now-extant remedial structures. Other considerations
should also enter into the calculus: What remedial arrangement is fairest to
the constitutional claimant? What remedial arrangement best deters
government misconduct? What remedial arrangement is most easily
administered by judges? And so on. None of this is to say that we should
never reform remedies. Some of the remedial reforms already outlined
might be well-founded for reasons having nothing to do with the spillover
problem. But it is to say that the project of restructuring remedies involves
a whole lot more than the issue of cross-remedial spillover. It’s not worth
launching missiles to kill mice.107 And it may not be worth pursuing largescale remedial reforms simply for the sake of curbing spillover across
remedies.
C. Remedy Diversifying
A final “non-disaggregation” strategy draws its inspiration from the
fascinating recent scholarship of Professor Nancy Leong.108 Her core idea
involves diversifying the remedial regimes in which a given substantive
right gets adjudicated, so as to improve the overall quality of rights-based
law. Her work, to be clear, targets a somewhat different set of problems
than does this Article.109 But its basic insights might provide the basis for a
107

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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See Leong, supra note ?.
109
As I understand Professor Leong’s argument, the central worry is that the day-in,
day-out implementation of a substantive norm in the same remedial setting will weaken
judges’ understanding of the norm itself. If judges do not adjudicate a substantive rule in
multiple remedial contexts, Leong posits, they are likely to neglect important interests
associated with the rule. See, e.g., id. at 462 (“Rights that emerge through litigation in
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third anti-spillover strategy, which would attempt to utilize the process of
cross-remedial spillover against itself.
Professor Leong has argued that courts and lawmakers should
deliberately structure procedural and remedial rules to ensure that rights
adjudication occurs within “multiple contexts.” That is so, she argues,
because “when litigation of a particular right takes place only in one
context, as is the case for many if not most constitutional rights, the inherent
features of that context begin to distort the right.”110 Single-context rightsmaking, among other things, will “tend[] to focus courts on some variables
at the expense of others,” and will thus generate law that “less thoroughly
considers the various circumstances in which it will apply” and “less
compellingly reflects the relationship of particular doctrines to our legal
regime as a whole.”111 These problems can be avoided, she asserts, if we
“adjust incentives so that litigation flourishes freely in multiple contexts.”112
These observations might form the basis of a third anti-spillover
strategy, which would pursue the diversification of remedial inputs on
substantive law. Whereas the “remedy equalizing” strategy seeks to even
more than one context reflect a richer and more nuanced conception of doctrine.”); id. at
464 (noting that “single-context rights-making leaves worse off . . . our understanding of
Fourth Amendment rights”). Hence arises the need to diversify the remedial settings
associated with a given right, so as to ensure that judges remain aware of the full panoply
of interests that the right serves to promote. This objective would not necessarily require
courts to apply substantive law uniformly across different remedial contexts—in theory, at
least, courts could tailor substantive rules according to remedial particularities, while still
acquiring an improved understanding of the norm itself—but Professor Leong has at least
implicitly suggested that she envisions “multiple context” adjudication working in concert
with a single, non-disaggregated body of rights-based law. See, e.g., Nancy Leong,
Civilizing Batson, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1561, 1583 (2012) (“Litigation in multiple contexts
generates better law. Courts see a wider range of interests and circumstances represented,
and are more likely to craft doctrinal rules that will apply appropriately in all
circumstances.” (emphasis added)).)
My concern, by contrast, is with the unwanted spillover that occurs when
precedent shaped within one remedial context binds judges who would otherwise respond
differently to cases arising in separate remedial context. The worry, in other words, is that
a judge who would like to pursue one particular resolution of a case (and who is fully
aware of all the interests implicated by a given substantive norm) must sometimes follow
precedent that derived from considerations related to a totally different set of remedial
variables. That worry does not necessarily conflict with Professor Leong’s worry about
deteriorated judicial understandings of substantive norms. But my prescribed solution to
the problem I’ve identified might well undermine her prescribed solution to the problem
she has identified, at least insofar as the latter requires the uniform application of rightsbased law across divergent remedial settings. In my view, that would be a trade worth
making.
110
Leong, supra note ?, at 407.
111
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112
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out each existing remedy’s effect on a substantive rule, this strategy would
strive simply to increase the number of remedies (notwithstanding their
divergent influences) that attach to that rule, hoping that over time the
remedy-specific influences will cancel one another out. One might say, for
instance, that the centrality of some remedial contexts tends to exert
distortive influences on rights-based law—for example, in the manner that
the habeas remedy tends to the constrict the right to effective assistance of
counsel—and that’s just always going to be true. But other remedies, one
might say, could exert influences in the other direction—for example, in the
manner that damages remedies under § 1983 might permit more frequent
judicial declarations that the ineffective assistance right has been violated.
If both remedies were to enter the picture, each could serve to moderate the
other’s influence on the ineffective assistance right, thus allowing judges to
strike a better balance between the competing interests at stake. Thus, for
instance, ineffective-assistance claimants in habeas proceedings would have
more of a fighting chance if they could cite to some ineffective-assistance
precedents made in § 1983 proceedings, while continued habeas
adjudication of effective-assistance claims will prevent § 1983 actions from
creating an effective assistance right that unduly burdens defense attorneys.
In short, the diversification strategy would allow courts to use spillover to
their advantage, ensuring that over time, a properly balanced—though still
uniform—set of substantive rules will emerge.113
This strategy too, however, presents significant problems. For one
thing, it is not clear that all remedy-specific influences on substantive rules
require moderation of the sort that the diversification strategy would
provide. Perhaps, for instance, judges in habeas cases are denying
ineffective assistance claims at an appropriate rate, given the special
concerns about finality that arise when habeas petitioners seek collateral
review. If so, overruling Polk County v. Dodson would not provide a
necessary corrective to the status quo.114 Or perhaps an expansion of §
1983 relief would, without more, strike a more appropriate balance between
the competing interests in this field of law. In other words, even if the
Court did reintroduce the § 1983 remedy for ineffective assistance
violations, we might not wish for lower courts to be relying on habeasbased ineffective-assistance precedents when adjudicating damages-based
ineffective assistance claims. Professor Leong takes it for granted that we
113

The idea here is different from the “all contexts” strategy discussed in Section II.A
infra. The “all contexts” strategy calls on judges to bear in mind all remedial contexts
currently associated with a substantive rule, whereas the diversification strategy calls on
judges (and lawmakers) to increase the number of remedial contexts associated with that
rule.
114
See Dodson, 454 U.S. 312.
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should discourage remedial arrangements that “focus[] courts on some
variables at the expense of others.”115 But why should that be? Within
some remedial settings it may be sensible to downplay the significance of
some variables and to play up the significance of others. (Consider, for
instance, the heightened sensitivity to liberty interests—and concomitantly
reduced receptivity to government interests—that the rule of lenity reflects
in criminal statutory interpretation cases.) And when that is so, the
conscious pursuit of diversified remedial inputs would serve to frustrate
rather than facilitate sensible balances that status quo regimes have already
struck.
In addition, the diversification strategy might cause one remedy’s
influence on a substantive rule to overcompensate for another’s. It is true,
for instance, that remedy-specific influences might helpfully complement
one another; but that is not the only possible outcome of the crosspollination process that the diversification strategy promotes. Suppose, for
instance, that we had concluded that criminal adjudication of Fourth
Amendment claims is biased in favor of law enforcement interests, whereas
civil adjudication of analogous claims is biased in favor of privacy
interests.116 We might envision a salutary averaging process emerging from
a greater integration of these two remedial contexts, with the progovernment excesses of the criminal context neutralizing the antigovernment excesses of the civil context (and vice versa). But the process
might also yield a less happy equilibrium, with the doctrinal influences of
the one remedial regime overcompensating for (or perhaps totally
overwhelming) those of the other. Perhaps, for instance, the diversification
strategy would repair Fourth Amendment analysis in criminal cases, but
only at the expense of rendering it too hostile to government interests in
civil cases. Or perhaps it will repair Fourth Amendment analysis in civil
cases, but only at the expense of rendering it too pro-government in
criminal cases. It’s hard to know. Common law adjudication is a pathdependent process, whose outputs are highly sensitive to small fluctuations
in the sequencing and frequency of the different inputs it digests.117 So,
115

Leong, supra note ?, at 407.
Compare id. at 463 (noting that that criminal adjudication of Fourth Amendment
claims tends to foreground the “evidence-gathering interest of law enforcement,” while
giving too little attention to “other interests that may or may not justify the use of force
during the same police-citizen interaction”), with id. at 450 (speculating that civil
adjudication of Fourth Amendment claims tends to “skew[] lawmaking by focusing courts’
attention on innocent plaintiffs – who may be unrepresentative of all those on whom force
is used – and on law enforcement interests relating to civilian violence and officer safety –
which may fail to capture many significant law enforcement interests”).
117
See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 622–50 (2001).
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while it’s entirely possible that multiple-context rights-adjudication could
alleviate spillover in helpful ways, the experiment might also backfire.
Finally, even assuming that the diversification strategy would
improve the quality of substantive doctrine, there remains the question of
whether the game is worth the candle. Increasing the number of remedial
inputs on substantive law necessarily means increasing the number of
remedies available to individual litigants, whether through the direct
introduction of new causes of action, or through indirect reforms to
immunity doctrines, rules regarding attorneys’ fees, jurisdictional and
justiciability requirements, and so forth.118 And, so, we must ask: are the
benefits to be gained from a more holistic, all-things-considered body of
rights-based law worth the costs that will result from letting more and more
claimants into the courthouse? We might worry, among other things, about
an avalanche of frivolous cases, crowded judicial dockets, and unwanted
chilling effects on government behavior.119 Even more troubling is the
danger that the project will create a boomerang effect, as judges faced with
a significant expansion of constitutional remedies would respond with
reactionary contractions in the scope of constitutional guarantees.120 These
bad results—or even the risk of them—may not be worth enduring merely
to foster the development of a more cross-fertilized body of substantive law.
*

*

*

Each of the non-disaggregation strategies that I have outlined in this
Part suffers from serious problems. These problems, moreover, stem
largely from the non-disaggregating nature of the strategies themselves.
Courts can adjudicate substantive law with “all remedial contexts” in mind,
but they still must negotiate unsatisfactory compromises between the
competing needs of different remedial domains. Courts can “equalize”
remedial structures, so as to reduce the extent of spillover from one domain
to another, but by equalizing these structures they will tamper with a whole
host of other priorities that the structures themselves have been designed to
promote. And courts can diversify the remedial settings in which they
fashion substantive rules, but only by incurring the risk of exacerbating
rather than ameliorating spillover across remedies. The strategies all carry
limited promise, in other words, because they attempt to force different
sizes of feet into the same shoe.
118

See Leong, supra note ?, at 477.
See generally Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (separating out and evaluating the validity of arguments along these
lines).
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That being so, we should look for productive ways in which to scale
back the uniform, cross-remedial operation of the substantive law. Rather
than target the manner in which particular remedies exert influences on the
content of particular substantive rules, courts should focus their energies on
preventing those influences from migrating into remedial environments
where they would not otherwise have taken hold. That is, in my view, a
more promising approach to the problem of spillover across remedies. It is
also, as the next section shows, an approach that the law has already begun
to pursue.
III.

DISAGGREGATING SUBSTANTIVE LAW

Though not often admitting to it, courts have sometimes departed
from the idea that substantive rules should apply uniformly across different
remedial contexts. They have most often achieved the departure through
the development and use of built-in exceptions to remedial rules. Remedial
exceptions, I argue, represent the primary means by which courts manage
cross-remedial spillover. When, for instance, a court cites the qualified
immunity rule as the basis for denying a claim for damages under § 1983, it
leaves itself free to vindicate similar substantive claims raised in connection
with different remedial requests. When a court cites the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule as the basis for its denial of a suppression
motion, the decision leaves open the possibility that identical government
conduct might still trigger other forms of relief. And when an appeals court
cites the harmless error rule as the basis for not reversing a judgment below,
it leaves trial judges free to remediate identical errors in future cases.
Remedial exceptions thus enable judges to deny relief in a manner that
leaves other remedial domains unaffected. Rather than reject a substantive
claim on its merits, judges may instead reach for an exception to the remedy
itself, and thereby create precedent that lacks cross-remedial effect.
The upshot of all of this is disaggregated rights across remedies.
With remedial exceptions in place, one substantive claim can trigger some
forms of judicial relief, but not others. And that means, in effect, that the
scope of a substantive norm ends up varying across the different remedies
used to enforce it. It is true, of course, that remedial exceptions do not
inject any formal variation into the substantive law itself (the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, for instance, does not purport to alter
Fourth Amendment doctrine proper; it simply says that a certain remedy
cannot issue when certain Fourth Amendment claims are raised). But as a
functional matter, remedial exceptions often exert an unmistakably
disaggregating effect on substantive legal rules—rendering the same rules
more or less difficult to remediate depending solely on the type of
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remediation sought.121 Thus, if we desire to manage spillover by way of
exceptions to remedial rules, we must also be willing to tolerate crossremedial variation in the substantive law.
A. The Disaggregating Effect of Remedial Exceptions
The disaggregating effect of remedial exceptions is perhaps best
illustrated by reference to the exclusionary rule. Not long after Mapp v.
Ohio did the Court begin identifying types of Fourth Amendment violations
that did not warrant suppression, and the number of these carve-outs has
grown over the years. The suppression remedy is also not available, for
instance, when officers have placed good-faith reliance on an unlawfully
issued warrant.122 The remedy is also not available when the officers’ only
Fourth Amendment violation involves a failure to honor the “knock and
announce” requirement,123 or when officers have unlawfully acquired
evidence that would inevitably have been discovered in the absence of the
Fourth Amendment violation.124 In these and other circumstances, the
doctrine allows courts to recognize that Fourth Amendment violations have
occurred while still refusing to furnish exclusionary relief.125
These exceptions have generally struck commentators as libertyreducing. After all, they deprive constitutional claimants of a remedy for
violations of their rights, and they cause some future violations to go
undeterred.126 But these exceptions also further an important libertypromoting goal. If we assume, not unrealistically, that features unique to
121

In advancing the claim that remedial exceptions exert a “disaggregating effect” on
the substantive law, I do not mean to imply that such exceptions change the essentialist
“meaning” or “content” of substantive norms. This is a contested issue, compare, e.g.,
Levinson, supra note ?, with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1313–17 (2006). But it is irrelevant to
my central point here, which is that remedial exceptions mitigate spillover across remedies
by varying the applicability of substantive norms across different remedial settings. I
believe it is helpful to characterize this phenomenon as involving the “disaggregation” of
substantive law, but one might just as well characterize it as involving “selective
withholding” of different remedies from a uniformly defined substantive rule. The
disaggregation strategy, in other words, should appeal to pragmatists and essentialists alike,
though the latter may wish to call it by a different name.
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Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2505–27 (1996).
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See id. at 2534 (arguing that “the police are very apt to ‘hear’ the decision rules
[i.e., remedial rules] that the Supreme Court makes (and that lower federal and state courts
apply) and thus to adjust their attitudes about what behavior ‘really’ is required by the
Court’s conduct rules [i.e., substantive rules]”).
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the suppression-hearing context push judges to err on the side of not
excluding evidence, then exceptions to the exclusionary remedy permit
them to achieve this result without affecting the application of search-andseizure protections in other remedial environments. With no remedial
exceptions in place, judges would be unable to deny exclusion unless they
held that the government never violated the defendant’s rights. But when
exceptions to the exclusionary remedy are available, judges may invoke
these exceptions to uphold admission of probative evidence, while leaving
unaltered the substantive content of the Fourth Amendment right itself. The
result of the suppression hearing is the same, but its precedential effects are
different, with the impact of a denial of relief running no further than the
confines of the remedy itself.127
Other remedial exceptions do similar work. Professor John Jeffries
has argued, for instance, that qualified immunity doctrine—which serves as
a major exception to § 1983 damages liability—helps to “reduce the cost of
innovation, thereby advancing the growth and development of constitutional
law.”128 Professor Jeffries’s argument highlights the cross-temporal
dynamics of constitutional adjudication: He aims to demonstrate how the
qualified immunity defense promotes the adaption of constitutional rights to
changing circumstances. His essential insight, however, also suggests how
immunity rules can and do alleviate spillover across remedies: Qualified
immunity doctrine targets not the law of rights but rather the law of
remedies, and it thereby helps to shield other remedial environments from
adverse spillover effects. A similar point holds with respect to the nonretroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane and other “exceptions” to habeas corpus
relief; if every expansion of every constitutional guarantee warranted fullscale retroactive remediation, courts would seldom expand such guarantees
to begin with.129 But by denying collateral relief through the use of
remedial exceptions—rather than the narrowing of substantive
protections—courts can prevent remedy-specific considerations from
shaping the cross-remedial content of substantive law.
Remedial exceptions do not formally vary the content of substantive
rules across different remedial settings. The same substantive definition of
127

This is not to say that remedial exceptions to the exclusionary rule have resulted in
an overall expansion of Fourth Amendment liberties; the point is only that the exceptions’
curtailment of Fourth Amendment liberties has been tempered by their remedy-specific
scope.
128
Jeffries [Yale L.J.], supra note ?, at 98.
129
Jeffries [VA. L. REV.], supra note ?, at 80 n.? The same is true of AEDPA-based
restrictions on federal court review of state court convictions, which require significant
judicial deference to the constitutional determinations of state courts. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b). AEDPA deference permits federal court judges to deny habeas relief without
having to propound restrictive, cross-remedial principles of substantive law.
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what constitutes probable cause applies, for instance, regardless of whether
a trial court judge considers a suppression motion or a magistrate judge
considers an application for a search warrant; it’s just that additional hurdles
must be cleared in order for the suppression remedy to issue, whereas the
denial of a warrant application would follow automatically from a
magistrate’s identification of fatal Fourth Amendment defects. At another
level, though, remedial exceptions generate disaggregated substantive law,
because they produce a world in which Fourth Amendment claims capable
of generating relief vary according to the type of relief being sought. The
Fourth Amendment as applied in the exclusionary setting permits police to
enter homes without announcing their presence, whereas the Fourth
Amendment as applied in the § 1983 setting does not. Likewise, the Fourth
Amendment as applied in the exclusionary setting permits the unreasonable
acquisition of evidence that will be inevitably discovered, whereas the
Fourth Amendment as applied in the warrant-issuing setting does not.
Similar points can be made about the disaggregating effect of other
remedial exceptions. The harmless error rule, for instance, renders
evidentiary restrictions less exacting when they underlie requests for
appellate relief than when they underlie requests for trial-level relief.
Qualified immunity doctrine renders the First Amendment less protective
when asserted in damages actions against individual public officials than
when asserted as a defense to criminal prosecution. And the rules of nonretroactivity and AEDPA deference yield a far narrower set of operative
substantive rights with bite in the habeas context, as compared to the
operative substantive rights with bite on direct appeal.
In short, remedial exceptions mitigate spillover by severing the
connection between a decision to withhold application of a remedy and the
generation of substantive precedents with cross-remedial force. That is not
to say that the invocation of such exceptions leaves the substantive right
unaffected; much to the contrary, as we have seen, remedial exceptions
carry significant implications for the real-world efficacy of the substantive
right itself. But remedial exceptions carry these implications in a remedyspecific way, leaving unaltered (both formally and functionally) the
substantive law as it applies in connection with other remedial rules. And
that is the key to understanding how remedial exceptions alleviate spillover
across remedies: The dynamics of a given remedial setting exert influences
on the outcome of individual substantive cases; but remedial exceptions
confine these influences to the particular remedial setting that produces
them.
B. Limitations
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So is our work here done? Was all the above just a roundabout way
of saying that remedial exceptions have already solved the problem that
provoked the writing of this Article in the first place? No. In their current
form, many remedial exceptions reveal their share of difficulties as antispillover devices. These difficulties, to be clear, are not an inescapable
feature of remedial exceptions in the abstract; we can steer clear of the
difficulties by modifying the exceptions on the books, rather than giving up
altogether on the project of avoiding spillover through the strategic use of
remedial exceptions. But most (though not all) remedial exceptions take the
form of broad transsubstantive rules, and this in turn can create problems
from the perspective of cross-remedial spillover. In particular, a small set
of broadly applicable exceptions will fail to capture the full range of
scenarios in which judges might wish to inject disaggregation into the
substantive law. And the transsubstantive nature of these exceptions means
that judges can create such disaggregation only by creating new forms of
spillover within the law of remedies itself.
1. Inaptness
Courts do not design remedial exceptions solely with the problem of
cross-remedial spillover in mind. Other considerations factor into the
shaping of standards that dictate when remedial exceptions do and do not
apply: When, as a practical matter, is it too difficult to furnish relief?
What, if anything, do the relevant statutes say? Would other remedies be
available to enforce a right if an exception precluded enforcement in this
remedial context? And so forth. Many different—and sometimes
countervailing—objectives must be considered in mapping out the
conditions under which substantive violations trigger different kinds of
remedial action by the courts. For this reason, a given remedial exception
may not always work well in guarding against spillover across remedies.
Consider, for instance, the harmless error rule. As we have already
seen, harmless error analysis does not apply to so-called “structural” errors,
which trigger automatic reversal whenever they occur. If a court determines
that a structural error at trial was too insignificant to warrant reversal of a
conviction, the harmless error exception provides no help. The only way to
avoid issuing the remedy is to declare, disingenuously, that no legal error
ever occurred. Even beyond structural errors, moreover, there remain
problems. Harmless error analysis focuses first and foremost on the
variable of prejudice; it offers no assistance to judges who wish to affirm
convictions in the face of errors with prejudicial effects. Yet there may be
circumstances in which even prejudicial errors will strike judges as too
insubstantial to warrant full-bore appellate relief. (Imagine, for instance,
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that a trial judge has pushed the boundaries of a hearsay rule, admitting
evidence that contributed to a jury’s finding of guilt but without offending
any of the substantive interests that the rule was intended to promote.) In
these settings, harmless error analysis and its prejudice-based focus will still
leave appellate judges reluctant to identify close-to-the-borderline violations
of the substantive law, even where the primary basis for their reluctance
derives from considerations specific to the reversal remedy itself.
Consider, too, damages relief under § 1983 liability. Under the
status quo regime, qualified immunity doctrine provides the primary means
by which courts can avoid imposing damages on public officials, regardless
of the particular type of claim asserted against them. Thus, for instance,
had the Court wished to deny relief in Paul v. Davis without affecting the
cross-remedial content of procedural due process doctrine (and without
creating a new exception to the § 1983 damages remedy), it could have
invoked the qualified immunity exception: Rather than holding that the
defendant did nothing wrong as a matter of procedural due process law, the
Court could have disposed of the case by declaring that the defendant never
violated a clearly established constitutional right.130 But invoking qualified
immunity in Paul would not have assuaged the Court’s concerns about
converting the Fourteenth Amendment into a “font of tort law.” That
alternative rendering of Paul would have left lower courts free to establish
new procedural due process requirements in future Paul-like cases, and
those requirements, once clearly established, would have empowered future
§ 1983 plaintiffs to secure damages relief against public officials who ran
afoul of them. A qualified immunity holding, in other words, would have
worked to insulate the Paul defendants from damages liability under §
1983, but not future defendants in similar cases. Given what remedial
exceptions were then at its disposal, the Court in Paul could thus have
concluded that the only way to foreclose defamation-like tort actions under
the Due Process Clause was to render a cross-remedial decision about the
constitutional right itself.
Or, take the exclusionary remedy. Punctuated as it already is with
exceptions, the remedial law of exclusion may still not account for the full
range of circumstances in which a judge’s reluctance to exclude evidence
renders her unwilling to declare that a violation of the law occurred. A
search or seizure may not trigger any current exception to the exclusionary
rule, but if the unlawfully obtained evidence is probative enough, the
alleged violation insignificant-seeming enough, and the societal interest in
securing a conviction strong enough, then a judge may still be looking for a
way out of the troublesome task of furnishing relief. Under such
130

See Jeffries [VA. L. REV. 47], supra note ?, at 79 n.115.
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circumstances, remedial exceptions will fail to prevent cross-remedial
spillover; with no ready-made exception at the judge’s disposal, the likely
outcome of the case will be a declaration that the government at all times
comported with the law.
None of this is to say that the current smorgasbord of exceptions
within these and other remedial domains is wholly ineffective at mitigating
spillover across remedies.
Without these exceptions in place, the
substantive protections of cross-remedial law would be narrower than what
the status quo provides. But utilizing the exceptions on the books to combat
the particular problem of cross-remedial spillover can sometimes feel like
trying to fit square pegs into round holes. The status quo regime presents
courts with a small number of remedial exceptions designed to resolve a
large number of very different cases; these exceptions may therefore fail to
capture each and every instance in which the remedial dynamics of a case
militate against the granting of relief. Consequently, even for remedies with
exceptions already attached to them, the threat of spillover remains.
2. Transsubstantivity
A further complication with remedial exceptions involves their
generally transsubstantive character. Just as substantive rights tend to apply
uniformly across remedies, so too does the law of remedies tend to apply
uniformly across substantive rights. Qualified immunity protections do not
change depending on whether a § 1983 plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth
Amendment violation or an Eighth Amendment violation;131 the harmless
error standard does not change depending on whether a trial court
misapplies the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment;132 and, with a
few exceptions,133 the same nonretroactivity restrictions on habeas corpus
relief apply across a wide variety of substantive claims. The
131

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. [Fordham L. Rev.], supra note ?, at 490; Jeffries [Yale
L.J.], supra note ?, at 259.
132
The standard does change, however, depending on whether a defendant asserts a
constitutional or nonconstitutional claim. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)
(setting forth an elevated standard for harmless error review in connection with claims of a
constitutional nature). Although I have elsewhere criticized this feature of the doctrine, my
criticisms focus on the constitutional/nonconstitutional distinction itself, as opposed to the
more general idea of varying harmless error requirements across different substantive
domains. See Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 695–97
(2013).
133
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (withholding “new rule” requirement from
“watershed” rulings of criminal procedure and laws that place “certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to proscribe”); see also
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (holding that Teague does not apply to
decisions narrowing the scope of substantive criminal statutes).
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transsubstantive nature of these and other remedial exceptions renders them
a problematic means of attacking cross-remedial spillover.
Suppose, for instance, that on an appeal from a conviction, a
criminal defendant argues that the trial judge unlawfully admitted some
piece of hearsay testimony proffered by the prosecution. Suppose,
moreover, that, while both the merits of the claim and the harmless error
analysis present a close call, the appeals court panel feels strongly that the
trial court’s alleged violation of the hearsay rule should not trigger the
windfall remedy of a new trial. The panel’s outlook on the case, in other
words, stems from a mixture of remedy-based and substance-based
considerations: The judges agree that the alleged violation of the hearsay
rule—if in fact a violation—did not amount to a serious enough legal error
to warrant the high remedial costs that a retrial would entail.
Having made up its mind that it wants to affirm the conviction, the
panel then asks how to reach this result. Should the panel hold that the trial
judge’s admission of the hearsay testimony did not violate an evidentiary
rule? Or should it hold that the admission of the hearsay testimony—
whether or not erroneous—was harmless to the defendant? Much of what
I’ve argued thus far would favor the latter route: The panel’s reluctance to
reverse derives from considerations unique to the context of appellate
review, so rejecting the claim on its merits would result in cross-remedial
precedent that binds judges at both appellate-court and trial-court levels.
All else equal, then, the court would do better to affirm via the harmless
error exception, thereby obviating the risk of spillover across remedies.
All else, however, may not be equal. For if the panel decides to
invoke the harmless error rule, it runs the risk of creating spillover in a
different direction: across rights. The harmless error rule, recall, is
generally transsubstantive. Thus, in denying relief on harmless error
grounds, the panel creates a new transsubstantive precedent concerning the
law of harmless error, shaping the analysis that future appellate judges will
apply in connection with different substantive claims. That is a problem
insofar as the original reason for invoking the harmless error rule—and thus
for contributing to the transsubstantive harmlessness standard—related to
the substantive particularities of the defendant’s case. Considerations
unique to one substantive rule shape a remedial precedent that attaches to
many other substantive rules.
To take one further example, suppose a habeas petitioner alleges that
a recent Supreme Court decision entitles him to retroactive relief. The
government disagrees, arguing (a) that the prior decision created a “new
rule” under Teague and therefore cannot form the basis for any postconviction attack; and (b) that even under the new Supreme Court
precedent, the defendant’s conviction was not the product of legal error.
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Suppose that both of these issues could go either way, but that the judge
considering the habeas petition regards the claim as insufficiently important
to warrant the high-cost remedy of habeas relief. The same dilemma thus
presents itself. The judge can deny the claim on its merits, but he will then
be allowing considerations specific to the habeas remedy to shape a
precedent with application in other remedial contexts. But if the judge
seeks refuge in the Teague rule, he will then be shaping a transsubstantive
remedial rule (i.e., the law governing what qualifies as a “new rule” under
Teague) by reference to considerations specific to the particular substantive
issue that the petitioner has raised.134 There will be spillover one way or the
other; the only thing left for the judge to decide is whether to channel it into
the law of remedies or into the law of rights.
We can generalize the point: Transsubstantive remedial exceptions
facilitate the avoidance of spillover across remedies, but only at the expense
of spillover across rights. When a court’s motivations to deny relief are
mixed—that is, grounded in considerations specific to a remedial context
and considerations specific to a substantive claim—its invocation of a
transsubstantive exception may therefore not always represent a viable antispillover strategy. The viability of the strategy will depend on the relative
degree to which rights-related and remedy-related considerations factor into
the court’s overall assessment of a claimant’s demands. The court must
essentially choose between the lesser of two evils: (a) cross-remedial
spillover problems caused by a remedy-motivated denial of a substantive
claim, and (b) transsubstantive spillover problems caused by a substancemotivated denial of a particular form of relief. In many cases, these harms
will be difficult to calculate. And even where the harms can be calculated, a
fully satisfactory doctrinal solution may still not emerge.
C. Better Exceptions?
134

Consider, for instance, the Court’s recent decision in Chaidez v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 1103 (2013), where it denied retroactive habeas relief to a petitioner whose counsel
failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a federal crime
(and thereby rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S.
356 (2010)). The Court held in Chaidez that its earlier decision in Padilla created a “new
rule” of Sixth Amendment law and therefore could not form the basis for retroactive relief,
notwithstanding strong doctrinal arguments to the contrary. See Chaidez, 113 S. Ct. at
1114–21 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). It is impossible to know precisely what motivated the
Court to deny relief in Chaidez, but one cannot ignore that deeming Padilla “non-new”
would have called into question a large number of pre-Padilla plea agreements entered into
by immigrant defendants. Insofar as this consideration (tethered to the Padilla right itself)
motivated the Court to deem Padilla “non-new” for purposes of habeas relief, the Court
would have allowed a substance-specific consideration to dictate the shape of a
transsubstantive remedial holding, thereby yielding spillover across rights.
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Nothing in these preceding sections suggests that remedial
exceptions are inherently unable to combat spillover in an effective way. I
have leveled my criticisms at existing features of existing exceptions, and
responding to these criticisms would therefore not require us to abandon the
project of crafting exceptions to remedial rules. Instead, it would require us
to shape and apply these exceptions in a more substance-specific and finely
tailored way.135
Notice, however, that the more finely-tailored and substancespecific our exceptions become, the harder it is to say with a straight face
that these exceptions are not in fact varying the cross-remedial applicability
of the substantive law. Functionally speaking, there is a vanishing
difference between layering multiple “substance-specific” remedial
exceptions atop a formally uniform body of substantive law, and declaring
straight up that the dictates of the substantive law vary according to the
remedial environment in which it applies. Where remedial exceptions are
few in number and transsubstantive in breadth, we can more plausibly
identify a conceptual separation between remedial and substantive rules:
We define the remedy’s availability, theoretically at least, in terms that do
not depend on substantive criteria, and we may therefore characterize the
remedial inquiry as totally and completely independent from whatever the
substantive law provides. (“All First Amendment requirements,” we can
plausibly say, “are capable of generating monetary relief against individual
defendants, but that relief is not available when those same First
Amendment requirements have not been clearly established.”) But where a
larger number of remedial exceptions target substance-specific criteria, this
no longer becomes the case. (It does not make much sense to say
something like: “All Fourth Amendment requirements are capable of
generating exclusionary relief, but exclusionary relief is not available when
the Fourth Amendment requirement at issue is the knock-and-announce
rule.”)
That observation helps to demonstrate how what might seem a quite
complex and radical project of reform can actually be achieved in a simple
and gradual fashion. Proliferating exceptions within the remedial law and
associating each exception with precise, substance-specific criteria may
sound like a daunting task. But it is really just another way of describing a
more candid and minimalist approach toward substantive lawmaking, which
freely blends together the rights-related and remedy-related elements of
courts’ reasoning. When remedial variables motivate substantive outcomes,
135

Although I am not the first to advocate for reducing the transsubstantivity of
remedial rules, see, e.g., Fallon [FORDHAM L. REV.], supra note ?, at 489; Jeffries [Yale
L.J.], supra note ?, at 291–92, the prior work on point has not explicitly focused on the
spillover-related benefits of doing so.
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the trick is simply to register these motivating effects within the doctrine
itself. Doing so will inject into the precedent a limiting principle that
permits differentiation in outcomes according to differentiated remedial
demands. We can characterize such a decision as creating a new
“substance-specific exception” to the remedy being sought, or we can
characterize it as creating a new, remedy-dependent rule of substantive law.
How we characterize the decision, though, is of far less significance than
what it allows us to achieve: a more disaggregated set of substantive norms
that better resists spillover across remedies.136
A useful template for this sort of “blending” approach involves the
prior restraint rule of First Amendment doctrine. In simplified form, the
rule calls for special First Amendment scrutiny of government efforts to
secure before-the-fact injunctions against would-be speakers, as compared
to after-the-fact punishments on persons who have already spoken. Though
not without its detractors,137 this rule reflects a common and longstanding
sentiment that pre-publication restraints on speech are “the most serious and
the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”138 And were
this sentiment not recognized by First Amendment doctrine, we might
worry about its potential to create cross-remedial spillover.139 Cases
involving injunctions against speech would—due to the presence of a prespeech injunction—generate rules of strict First Amendment protection,
which would then limit the government’s use of less offensive remedies to
regulate speech of a similar character. But the prior restraint rule blocks
this outcome. By reifying the idea that pre-publication injunctions against
speech receive especially strict First Amendment review, the prior restraint
rule ensures that the precedential effects of prior restraint cases will not run
beyond the prior restraint context.
Spillover is avoided—and
disaggregation achieved—by nothing more than a candid judicial
acknowledgment that substantive and remedial considerations should be
blended together in a special way.140
136

One potential consequence of the characterization we adopt, which I bracket here,
involves constitutional rights and remedies. Insofar as some remedies for constitutional
harms are grounded in nonconstitutional rules of statutory (or common) law, then
substance-specific rules of “remedial” law might be amendable by statute, whereas
remedy-specific rules of constitutional law would not be.
137
See, e.g., Marin Scordato, Distinction Without A Difference: A Reappraisal of the
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1989); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking
Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First
Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the
Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982).
138
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973).
139
I am grateful to Geof Stone for bringing this point to my attention.
140
Other examples from the First Amendment context reveal an analogous approach to
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The prior restraint rule thus represents the sort of “remedial
exception” that effectively targets spillover across remedies. It is
particularized and substance-specific. It blends together substance-based
and remedy-based considerations. It therefore yields holdings that apply in
free-speech cases involving pre-publication injunctions, but not in cases
involving other speech-related remedies. With the rule in place, the risk of
cross-remedial spillover diminishes, as does the spillover risk produced by
the blunt and transsubstantive remedial exceptions on which courts might
otherwise end up relying. Clearly, moreover, the prior restraint rule
“disaggregates” First Amendment law. It causes the strength of a speaker’s
First Amendment claims to fluctuate with the sort of remedy involved in the
speaker’s case, even keeping constant the content and societal value of the
speech itself. And all of that is achieved through the courts’ frank and
explicit acknowledgment that a particular remedy has affected their outlook
on a substantive claim.
Can courts achieve similar forms of disaggregation within other
areas of the substantive law? The next Section considers that possibility.
D. Further Reforms
Consider first the Court’s decisions in Washington v. Davis and Paul
v. Davis. Both decisions alluded to remedy-related reasons for rejecting the
plaintiffs’ substantive claims.
Neither decision, however, ended up
yielding the sort of disaggregated law that one might have expected to
develop. The Court in Washington v. Davis fretted about the intrusiveness
and complexity of structural reforms to the welfare state, and it cited these
difficulties as a reason for ratcheting up the difficulty of demonstrating
equal protection violations.141 The Court in Paul v. Davis similarly fretted
about the debilitating effects of damages actions against public officials,
and it cited these effects as a reason to deny procedural due process
protections to claimants suffering government-induced reputational
harms.142 Both analyses thus flirted with a blending together of remedyrelated and rights-related reasoning. In the end, however, they failed to
the spillover problem. In some areas of free-speech doctrine, courts have employed a
“penalty-sensitive” approach to First Amendment analysis, reflecting the assumption that,
all else equal, the harmfulness of a speech prohibition rises with the harshness of the
penalty attached to it. See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a PenaltySensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2012). By making
explicit the connection between penalty severity and First Amendment validity, the Court
helps to prevent variables specific to the nature of one penalty from dictating the First
Amendment doctrine that governs in cases involving very different penalties.
141
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
142
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
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produce meaningful cross-remedial variations in the substantive law.
The better course of action in these cases would have been to
identify the remedy-specific elements of the legal analysis and—critically—
to leave open the possibility of different substantive outcomes in alternative
remedial settings. Having noted that special features of the damages remedy
rendered it less receptive to the substantive claim, the Court in Paul v.
Davis should have gone on to hold that its “stigma plus” rule might or
might not warrant application in cases where damages were not at issue.
Having expressed its concerns about reallocating public resources via
structural injunctions, the Court in Washington v. Davis should likewise
have left open the possibility that equal protection claimants might satisfy a
lesser standard when not seeking civil relief. Precisely what the law would
have looked like in these other remedial environments need not have been
decided then and there; rather, the Court should simply have identified a
remedy-specific influence on its substantive holding while taking care not
to imply that the holding controlled within other remedial settings.
A similar point obtains with respect to hybrid statutes. Both
Chiarella and the Court’s holding in Thompson suffered from a judicial
unwillingness to disaggregate by blending. When implementing Rule 10b-5
in civil cases, both the Supreme Court and lower courts failed to highlight
the linkage between the non-criminal nature of the remedies sought and the
expansive substantive holdings that these rulings embodied. Consequently,
when Chiarella presented the question whether the Rule permitted criminal
insider trading prosecutions, the prior on-point precedents obscured from
view an important potential basis for distinguishing them away. And while
the Thompson Court did in fact acknowledge a remedial influence on its
holding, its rigid adherence to cross-remedial uniformity placed it in the
awkward position of following the rule of lenity in a case with nothing more
than a $200 tax refund at stake. The Court could have better managed the
spillover problem by resolving the statutory issue in Thompson on narrower
grounds, while emphasizing the remedy-dependent nature of the holding it
had rendered. That way, Thompson could have achieved an optimal
substantive result with respect to civil enforcement of the National Firearms
Act without interfering with future courts’ handling of criminal cases under
the NFA.
The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Plaza Health
Laboratories, Inc. reveals what a more disaggregated approach to hybrid
statutes might look like.143 The employee of a private laboratory had
dumped vials of blood into the Hudson River, and the government sought to
prosecute him for knowingly discharging pollutants in violation of the
143

3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Clean Water Act (“CWA”). The liability question turned on whether the
dumper of the vials qualified as a “point source” of pollutants under the
CWA. (Suffice it to say that the statute’s definition of the term—“any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged”144—
rendered the answer to this question nonobvious.) And in case the statutory
question wasn’t already complicated enough, the phrase “point source”
appeared within both criminal and civil provisions of the CWA, thus
presenting another variant on the hybrid statute dilemma.
The Second Circuit dealt with this conundrum just as it should have,
by blending together the substantive and remedial elements of its reasoning.
Having consulted the statutory text and legislative history, it concluded that
the interpretive question presented no obvious answer.145 It then explained:
Since the government’s reading of the statute in this case
founders on our inability to discern the obvious intention of
the legislature to include a human being as a “point source”,
we conclude that the criminal provisions of the CWA did not
clearly proscribe Villegas’s conduct and did not accord him
fair warning of the sanctions the law placed on that conduct.
Under the rule of lenity, therefore, the prosecutions against
him must be dismissed.146
And so, Villegas won his case, but not by way of a decision
establishing that the term “point source” excluded human beings for any
and all remedial purposes. Rather, he won the case by way of a holding that
drew together substantive and remedial considerations to produce a remedyspecific substantive rule: As the Second Circuit made clear, the CWA’s
lack of clarity, acting in concert with the rule of lenity, precluded the
government from criminally punishing humans as point sources. Nothing in
the court’s holding, however, barred anyone from seeking civil relief under
the CWA against polluters like Villegas.147 The court determined that the
statute wasn’t clear enough to warrant criminal prosecution, but it left open
144

Id. at 645 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).
Id. at 649.
146
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
147
Indeed, the court went out of its way to distinguish several civil cases involving the
scope of the CWA’s “point source” requirement, explaining that such cases had arisen in
“civil-penalty or licensing settings, where greater flexibility of interpretation to further
remedial legislative purposes is permitted, and the rule of lenity does not protect a
defendant against statutory ambiguities.” Id. at 648.
145
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the question whether the “humans are point sources” argument might carry
the day in a civil enforcement action. Plaza Health Laboratories thus
succeeded where both Thompson and Chiarella failed. Thus, while
Villegas’s bloody vials may well have spilled beyond the banks of the
Hudson, the precedential effects of his case did not spill beyond the
boundaries of the criminal law.
Consider,
finally,
Fourth
Amendment
probable
cause
determinations. In Illinois v. Gates, the Court characterized the probable
cause inquiry as presenting a “commonsense, practical question,” to be
governed by an “assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”148 In
addition, the Court stressed the need for “great deference” to a magistrate’s
probable cause determinations, explaining that courts should not “invalidate
warrants by interpreting affidavits in a hypertechnical, rather than a
commonsense, manner.”149 Put another way, magistrates get to employ an
indefinite standard while enjoying deferential review. The consequence, as
Professor Stuntz explained, is a remedial arrangement that permits
magistrates (on the one hand) and higher level judges (on the other) to apply
what in effect amount to “different standards”—standards whose
differences derive from the different substantive influences that their
remedial environments present.150
Stuntz suggested that this arrangement should be regarded as
sensible and unproblematic from the perspective of those who worry about
hindsight bias in suppression hearings. More than that, the arrangement
might count as positively beneficial. The Gates approach allows for higherranking courts to uphold magistrates’ probable cause determinations
without creating new law that binds below. The precedents generated in
suppression hearings, in other words, will generally concern remedyspecific principles of deference, rather than cross-remedial principles of
Fourth Amendment law. Consequently, trial courts may deny Fourth
Amendment claims without inflicting collateral damage on the substantive
standards that magistrates apply.
***
To recap the argument thus far: Remedies influence rights. Rights
apply across remedies. Distortions thus arise when a particular remedy
influences the scope of a substantive rule, which then imports the remedyspecific influence into other remedial environments. I have argued that the
best way to attack the spillover problem is by varying rights’ application
across different remedial contexts. To some extent, this is what courts
148
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already do. By utilizing exceptions to remedial rules, courts create ways for
themselves to grant some but not other forms of relief in response to
otherwise identical substantive claims. Even so, courts can do a better job,
by rendering the exceptions they apply more nuanced in definition and less
transsubstantive in scope.
That can often be accomplished by
acknowledging directly the remedial elements underlying a substantive
holding, thus assigning to that holding a precedential impact that extends no
further than the remedial context in which it was rendered.
That may be all fine and good from the perspective of the spillover
problem itself. But before we give a thumbs-up to the hidden modes of
disaggregation that remedial exceptions facilitate, and to the more explicit
forms of disaggregation that improved remedial exceptions would create,
we should ask whether the disaggregation strategy fits comfortably within
the broader legal framework of public law adjudication. Put another way,
even if we have proven it an effective means of combating the spillover
problem, we must still ask whether the disaggregation strategy comports
with basic values and priorities of the legal system writ large.
IV.

IS DISAGGREGATION PROPER?

I see four major objections to the strategy of disaggregating
substantive norms across remedial boundaries. The first objection holds
that the disaggregation strategy does not reflect the unitary nature of the
legal texts from which substantive rules derive. The second objection holds
that the disaggregation strategy undesirably complicates the law. A third
objection (related to the second) holds that disaggregating rights across
remedies undermines important values associated with the law’s generality.
And a fourth objection holds that certain (though not all) forms of
disaggregation will frustrate higher-level courts’ ability to supervise the
work of their lower-level counterparts. I address these four objections in
turn, concluding that while each has some merit, none offers a fatal case
against disaggregation as a response to cross-remedial spillover.
A. Conceptual Concerns
How can the same rule mean different things depending on the
remedial setting in which courts interpret it? The Constitution does not
contain one Fourth Amendment for suppression hearings and another for
probable cause hearings. It does not contain one Due Process Clause for
injunctive relief and another for damages relief. And hybrid statutes do not
(by definition) provide for differentiated substantive protections in different
remedial settings. Recognizing these realities may seem to pose a
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formidable obstacle to an anti-spillover strategy grounded in applying rights
differently depending on the remedy that is sought. If the texts we interpret
are unitary, then it would seem that our interpretations of those texts must
be uniform.151 The “oneness” of such texts, in other words, counsels
against assigning different substantive rules to different remedial settings.
The problem with this argument lies in its failure to distinguish
between two types of problems that judges confront: (1) higher-level
problems of legal interpretation; and (2) lower-level problems of legal
implementation.152 Not every doctrinal dispute concerns the “meaning” of a
legal text; many such disputes operate closer to the ground, focusing on
how legal provisions, their meaning once gleaned, apply to discrete
individual requests for judicial relief. Constitutional lawyers have long
understood this point. As Professor Richard Fallon has put the point,
although it is true that “the Court must craft doctrine in light of judgments
about what the Constitution means,” it is also true that “determinations of
constitutional meaning do not always, or perhaps even typically, dictate
with full precision what constitutional doctrine ought to be.”153 Indeed,
much doctrine exists not so much to resolve “uncertainty about which
values the Constitution encompasses and how protected values should be
specified,” but rather for the less grandiose—but vitally important—purpose
of “implement[ing]” the values once specified.154 Similar insights animate
Professor Mitchell Berman’s work on “constitutional decision rules”—the
large body of presumptions, evidentiary burdens, balancing tests, meansend analyses, and other doctrinal creations that permeate judge-made
constitutional law. “Much of existing constitutional doctrine,” he argues,
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“is better understood not as judicial statements of constitutional meaning
(i.e., as constitutional operative propositions) but rather as judicial
directions regarding how courts should decide whether such operative
propositions have been satisfied.”155
Mapping the doctrinal landscape in this way helps to demonstrate
why variations in substantive doctrine need not reflect variations in textual
meaning. Some constitutional cases—often of the blockbuster variety—
require courts to speak in terms of what Professor Berman calls “operative
propositions” of constitutional law (e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment
governs affirmative action; the First Amendment governs campaign finance
regulation; the Commerce Clause restricts Congress’s ability to regulate
economic “inactivity,” etc.), and it would be odd indeed to encounter crossremedial variations in holdings stated at such high levels of generality. But
in many constitutional cases, the content of the operative proposition is not
at issue; what matters instead is how the proposition translates into realworld judicial outcomes. And in these sorts of cases, the unitary nature of
the text provides no good reason for maintaining absolute substantive
uniformity across different remedial environments. By employing a
conceptual apparatus that “cleav[es] meaning from rules”—as Professor
Jennifer Laurin has put it—courts can vary the latter without destabilizing
the former.156
This is not to say that it will always be easy to distinguish between
questions of overarching meaning and questions of implementation, or that
we can cleanly articulate the difference between “operative constitutional
propositions” and “constitutional decision rules.” Some would say that
Washington v. Davis’s holding goes to the core meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause, while others would be more inclined to view the holding
as a setting forth a “decision rule” about the evidentiary burdens that equal
protection claimants bear. Still others would regard these distinctions as
pointless, instead maintaining that “the meaning of a constitutional
provision is its implementation”—nothing less and nothing more.157
Conceptual disagreements aside,158 however, the critical point remains:
Remedy-based variations in substantive doctrine need not create tension
with the unitary nature of the enactments from which they derive.
So much for constitutional enactments; what about their
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nonconstitutional counterparts? Here, the conceptual argument against
cross-remedial variation might pack a bigger punch. With modern-day
statutes, as opposed to ancient constitutional provisions, one can more
easily resort to the claim that if “Congress intends distinctions between
different forms of enforcement under a hybrid statute, it can simply write
them into the statutory text.”159 And the proponent of uniformity can often
wield alluring expressio unius arguments as well. In some hybrid statutes,
Congress has specified that particular substantive norms ought to apply
differently depending on the remedial setting in which they operate. From
these statutes, one might infer that Congress considered—and rejected—the
possibility of permitting cross-remedial variations other than those directly
manifested by the text itself.160 No surprise then that the Supreme Court
recently characterized as “novel” and “dangerous” the idea that “judges can
give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases.”161
Even with respect to statutes, however, it is far from clear that the
conceptual claim for uniformity supports a categorical prohibition on
substantive variation across remedies. To begin with, as Professor Jonathan
Siegel has shown, the Court’s recent admonitions about the “novelty” and
“dangerousness” of varying the scope of statutory commands from one
context to another are belied by many of its earlier pronouncements, which
have attached “multiple meanings” to “a single term or phrase in a single
statutory provision” depending on the factual or remedial setting in which it
is applied.162 In addition, notwithstanding the tendency of courts and
commentators to associate statutory cases with “interpretative” problems,
the “decision rules” insight seems no less applicable to statutory rules than
to constitutional rules. With statutes, as with the Constitution, we need not
discern any and all variations in the substantive doctrine as registering
multiple “interpretations” or “meanings” of a single textual provision;
rather, we may instead characterize them as registering multiple
implementation strategies for a provision whose semantic content—or
“operative proposition”—remains fixed.163 And finally, arguments of the
“if they’d meant it, they’d have said it” variety have a question-begging
quality to them. Congress can just as easily prohibit non-uniform
enforcement of hybrid statutes as it can permit such enforcement, so why
159
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should we infer anything at all from the absence of express guidance one
way or the other? Rather than speculate as to what Congress did or did not
mean to communicate via its failure to articulate how a single statutory
provision should apply across remedial boundaries, courts might simply try
their best to forge practical doctrinal responses to questions that were in
reality unaddressed in the drafting process.
B. Administrability Concerns
A more significant objection to the disaggregation strategy sounds in
worries about complexity and administrability. On a simplified model of
the status quo regime, courts enforce a finite number of rights by way of a
finite number of remedies. To evaluate a given claim for relief, they refer
first to a discrete body of substantive law, whose content does not formally
depend on the remedy being sought, and then to a discrete body of remedial
law, whose content does not formally depend on the right being invoked.
Adjudicating matters in this way produces substantial informational
shortcuts for judges and litigants alike. If the law contains N different rights
and M different remedies, courts can handle N x M right-remedy
combinations by reference to N + M bodies of law. That is, courts and
litigants can sequentially employ a small number of substantive and
remedial doctrines (e.g., First Amendment law, Second Amendment law,
the law of injunctions, the law of damages) to resolve a much larger number
of potential right-remedy requests (e.g., a demand for injunctions as redress
for a Second Amendment violation, a demand for damages as a redress for a
First Amendment violation, a demand for exclusion as a redress for a Fourth
Amendment violation, and so on). If we have ten different substantive rules,
enforceable via five different remedial rules, then fifteen bodies of doctrine
provide all the guidance we need. In contrast, a fully disaggregated regime
could produce as many as fifty different “right-remedy” bodies of law to
govern the same set of cases.
At its endmost extreme, my call for disaggregated substantive law
would substantially increase the number of different doctrines that judges
must create and lawyers must learn. No longer could a request for damages
under the First Amendment be resolved by reference to a single crossremedial rule of First Amendment doctrine and a single transsubstantive
rule of § 1983 doctrine. Courts would instead consult a specialized, selfcontained area of “First Amendment damages” doctrine, which would exist
alongside thousands of other self-contained bodies of “right-remedy” law.
It takes no great leap of imagination to envision the confusion, complexity,
and frustration that such an arrangement might yield. Is that a price worth
paying for the sole sake of mitigating spillover?
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Probably not. But we need not frame the issue as presenting an allor-nothing choice. Instead of asking whether we should permit total
disaggregation of the substantive law or no disaggregation at all, we should
simply ask whether judges might sometimes adapt substantive rules to
particular remedial contexts as a means of attacking spillover. The relevant
inquiry, in other words, involves the extent to which judges should vary
substantive requirements according to remedial demands, rather than the
propriety or non-propriety of their doing so on an unrestrained, wholesale
basis. Indeed, one of the great virtues of the disaggregation strategy is its
ability to accommodate a substantial amount of fine-tuning. One can, for
example, disaggregate First Amendment prior restraint law from First
Amendment subsequent punishment law, while still ensuring that most key
substantive principles of free speech doctrine remain constant across each.
And one can tolerate some amount variance between higher and lower
courts in the application of “structural” trial rights, while still adhering to a
core set of requirements that both lower courts and higher courts must
enforce. Much more so than the “non-disaggregation” strategies discussed
in Part II, the disaggregation strategy permits judges to tailor the degree and
character of their disaggregating solutions according to the degree and
character of the spillover problems they confront. Rather than “missiles to
kill mice,” the disaggregation strategy gives them mousetraps.
The question then becomes how much disaggregation we should
tolerate. At its core, this question presents yet another variant on the rulesstandards tradeoff.164 Cross-remedial uniformity in the substantive law
promotes simplicity, predictability, low decision costs, and so forth; crossremedial variation promotes adaptability, nuance, and fewer distortions in
the law. How far we want to take the disaggregation strategy depends
largely on where we fall on the rules/standards spectrum. The more we like
rules, the less we will want to disaggregate; the more we like standards, the
more we will look to do so.
My goal here is not to prescribe the optimal degree of
disaggregation that the spillover problem demands. Such a prescription—in
addition to implicating the deep divides of the rules/standards dilemma—
would likely depend on a host of contextual factors that will vary according
to the particular rights being disaggregated and the particular remedies
across which the disaggregation occurs. I do believe, however, that fears
related to complexity and administrability should not automatically force us
to dismiss out of hand the disaggregation strategy as a means of addressing
the spillover problem. This is not to say that concerns about elaborateness
and unworkability do not matter. No doubt, they reflect an important
164
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consideration that any response to the spillover problem must take into
account. But these fears are not reasons in themselves to eschew
disaggregation altogether.
C. Rule-of-Law Concerns
A related objection to this project might charge that disaggregation
as a response to cross-remedial spillover puts judges on a slippery slope
toward the eventual abandonment of important rule-of-law values. Law, it
is said, succeeds as a fair and just means of governance when its commands
are generally applicable,165 thus satisfying what Lon Fuller called the “first
desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of
rules.”166
In addition to keeping doctrine administrable and
comprehensible, the law’s generality helps to ensure that “like parties get
treated alike” and that cases get resolved (and evaluated) by reference to
objective and non-manipulable criteria, rather than the idiosyncrasies of
individual judges. Disaggregating the law, by definition, makes the law’s
articulation more nuanced, less general, and more context-dependent. As a
result, disaggregation might seem unfaithful to the project of having a legal
system in the first place.
No one, I suspect, would argue that all forms of cross-remedial
disaggregation pose an existential challenge to our legal order. Employing
one set of substantive rules for criminal cases and another for civil cases,
for example, would reduce the generality of substantive doctrine, but not in
a way that would provoke anxieties about the rule of law’s collapse.
(Criminal and civil cases, after all, have for hundreds of years employed
different standards of proof and different mens rea rules without the sky
falling down.) But “remedies” and “remedial environments” can be defined
at higher and lower levels of detail, and the higher the levels of detail
become, the less law-like cross-remedial distinctions may begin seem.
Simple distinctions across, say, “criminal” and “civil” remedies, or
“monetary” and “injunctive” remedies, would inject differentiation into the
substantive law without undermining its law-like character. But as the
distinctions are defined with greater specificity, the threat to rule-of-law
values intensifies. Judges, we might all agree, can safeguard generality
while varying the substantive law across cases involving damage awards
and cases involving injunctive relief. But what about varying it across cases
involving “high” damage awards and cases involving “low” damage
165
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awards? Across cases involving “high damage awards sought against poor
defendants” and cases involving “high damage awards sought against rich
defendants”? Across cases involving “high damage awards sought against
poor defendants with insurance” and cases involving “high damage awards
sought against poor defendants without insurance”? We could continue this
exercise ad nauseam until the operative “remedial environment” of a given
case boiled down to little more than its unique set of facts. At that point,
judges would no longer be applying “law” in any meaningful sense. Rather,
they would be resolving individual cases in accordance with whatever they
perceived justice to demand.
The takeaway from this point is not that we give up on the project of
alleviating cross-remedial spillover. Rather, it is that courts must recognize
some cut-off point to the level of detail at which they distinguish remedial
domains from one another. I cannot say precisely where on the spectrum
that cut-off point lies, but it does seem to me that we are very far from it.
The substantive doctrine of today—which, as we have seen, tends to apply
uniformly across even broadly-defined remedial categories—seems capable
of absorbing significantly more differentiation across remedies while still
maintaining its law-like character. Courts may therefore continue to
employ disaggregation strategies in response to the spillover problem
without giving rule-of-law proponents much cause for concern.
That being said, the rule-of-law objection does provide reason to
temper our expectations about what disaggregation can achieve. Spillover
in one form or another will inevitably occur as a consequence of developing
generally applicable rules via case-specific adjudication. We can isolate
holdings and differentiate across remedial variables so as to limit potential
cross-remedial spillover effects. But even when we have done this, the
factual particularities of one case might still yield substantive rules that
“spill over” into other factual contexts that would not have otherwise
produced them. If an especially winsome defendant raises a borderline
Fourth Amendment claim, his especially winsome nature might compel a
court to vindicate his claim and thereby create a precedent that dictates the
outcome of cases against less winsome defendants. An unusually
complicated request for injunctive relief might prompt judges to deny
recognition of a substantive claim and thereby create precedent governing
cases involving simpler injunctive requests.167 We can keep on trying to
cabin the results of these cases to the particular factual settings that
produced them, but at some point we will have to resist these urges lest we
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throw in the towel on maintaining generally applicable rules of law.168
This Article, however, has neither promised nor advocated
spillover’s total eradication. Rather, it has sought to identify a particular
form of spillover—spillover across remedies—whose reduction seems
feasible and worth pursuing. Generality is a good thing. But even in good
things we can partake too much. Just because the virtues of generality
preclude us from achieving total success in the battle against spillover does
not mean that we should give up on achieving any such success at all. To
the contrary, as I hope this Article has shown, substantial—though not
total—success in the battle against spillover lies within our reach.
D. The Special Problem of Vertical Spillover
Some forms of spillover occur across remedial settings at different
levels of the judicial hierarchy. I have suggested, for instance, that trial
judges who conduct suppression hearings may be less inclined to invalidate
a search ex post than magistrate judges would be to prohibit the same search
ex ante. Similarly, I have suggested that appellate judges may be more
reluctant to sustain post-trial allegations of structural error than trial judges
confronting such errors as they arise. These forms of “vertical spillover”
can be met with disaggregating responses. Courts might invoke exceptions
to “higher-level” judicial remedies, such as by denying exclusionary relief
to the victims of unlawful searches that are conducted in good faith while
making clear that magistrate judges should have never issued a warrant for
such searches in the first place. Or they can disaggregate the law more
subtly, such as by defining rights in open-ended terms and then
emphasizing deference to the substantive determinations of their lowercourt counterparts. Either way, courts can confront the risk of vertical
spillover by fashioning substantive holdings with limited precedential
effects on lower-court adjudication.
But disaggregation in response to vertical spillover presents a
special problem. Higher-level courts are supposed to supervise the work of
their lower-level counterparts, and vertical disaggregation will undermine
their ability to exercise oversight. The more often that higher courts
combine loosely defined substantive standards with principles of deference
on review, the freer the rein that lower courts receive to craft and apply the
168
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law as they see fit. And, while this free rein has the virtue of reducing
spillover across remedies, it also has the vice of inhibiting higher courts’
abilities to monitor for erroneous applications of the law below. (The Gates
standard, for instance, may help to prevent rights-constricting forces of the
suppression hearing context from affecting the law that warrant-issuing
magistrates apply, but it also means that magistrates need not worry too
much about a reversal of their judgments in subsequent criminal
proceedings.) Vertical disaggregation thus implicates a deep and inexorable
tension between two conflicting interests: (a) the interest in preventing
remedy-based influences unique to higher-court review from constricting
the substantive rules that lower courts apply, and (b) the interest in ensuring
that lower courts’ application of the law is subject to meaningful
supervision.
How to balance these two conflicting interests is a difficult question.
Its answer sometimes depends on empirical uncertainties. For example, to
what extent do trial and appellate judges actually suffer from hindsight bias
when resolving Fourth Amendment claims? Recent empirical research
suggests that judges may be more resistant to the bias than has generally
been supposed,169 in which case the Gates standard may require too much
deference to magistrate-level probable cause determinations. And, even if
we could resolve all the empirical unknowns, the tradeoff may involve areas
of deep normative disagreement: For instance, reducing appellate courts’
control over trial court-level review of structural errors disaggregates the
law not just across the appellate-court/trial-court divide, but also among the
many different trial courts within an appellate court’s jurisdiction. Similar
litigants may receive varied judicial treatment, as different trial judges—
lacking specific dictates from above—will end up applying different
versions of the same substantive protections. The degree to which this
outcome strikes us as problematic—and hence, vertical disaggregation as
undesirable—will depend on nothing less fundamental than our sense of
what it means to receive fair and equal treatment under the law.
Consequently, the case for disaggregation is more tentative as
applied to vertical spillover than as applied to horizontal spillover. Happily,
though, the sensibility of the vertical disaggregation strategy is a question
that may itself be disaggregated. We need not decide, once and for all,
whether the costs of vertical disaggregation exceed its benefits. Rather, we
may evaluate the strategy on a case-by-case basis, with due attention to the
particular substantive norm at issue, as well as the particular remedial
environments across which the disaggregation might occur. My hope is that
the foregoing discussion, while not rendering a definitive verdict on the
169
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vertical disaggregation strategy itself, at least identifies the criteria we
should consult when determining whether to disaggregate across vertically
situated remedies.
CONCLUSION
The analysis I have offered may strike some readers as a beginning
from a theoretically dubious premise. On a pragmatic conception of the
law, there simply is no meaningful difference between rights and
remedies—a right, in other words, counts for no more (and no less) than the
bundle of remedies it allows one to invoke, and a remedy counts for no
more (and no less) than the bundle of rights that it allows one to enforce.170
At the end of the day, there are just litigants and judicial actors, and the law
is nothing more than a means by which the former get the latter to do things
on their behalf. What ultimately matters is the question of how the law—
whether articulated in terms of “rights,” “remedies,” or both—permits
courts to flex their muscle against the outside world. Understood in this
light, the entire project of trying to respond to cross-remedial spillover
within the substantive law might seem doomed from the start. For the
project engages with a set of categories that are conceptually empty to begin
with.
I take seriously the pragmatists’ notion that the right/remedy
distinction may not be able to withstand serious theoretical scrutiny. For
purposes of this project, however, the conceptual soundness of the rightremedy distinction is beside the point. Whatever its conceptual soundness,
the right-remedy distinction is one around which our doctrinal universe has
been organized, and that organizational choice carries important real-world
consequences for the actual content of the law. The pragmatist may be
correct, in other words, to suggest that a well-functioning body of law need
not base itself around formally independent categories such as “rights” and
“remedies,” and there may well exist more sensible ways of arranging and
expressing the rules that govern the resolution of individual cases. But
when the law organizes itself around these categories, we must think
carefully about the ways in which the arrangement frustrates and facilitates
the achievement of desirable judicial outcomes. Attending to the problem
of spillover across remedies provides a means of doing just that.
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